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The Jury's Second Coming
JENNY E. CARROLL*
This Article explores the controversial issue of jury nullification by reconcep-
tualizing nullification through the lens of the Supreme Court's recent decisions,
beginning with Apprendi v. New Jersey. Apprendi's embrace of the jury's
historical powers requires a rejection of the formalized and static paradigm of
nullification in favor of a more fluid vision of the law. Despite extensive
scholarship surrounding Apprendi, an innovative (though admittedly counterin-
tuitive) reading of the case line has been overlooked. This reading draws on
Apprendi's embrace of a vision of the law constructed and completed through
jury interpretation and verdict. Interpreted in this way, the Apprendi case line
redefines the nature of the law itself and carries implications for the larger
democracy.
Implicit in Apprendi's reconception of the law is a radical reassessment ofthe
long-running debate over jury nullification. Properly understood, jury nullifica-
tion is not an act of extralegal rebellion but rather the moment when citizen
jurors lend meaning to the law through their interpretation. Without this oppor-
tunity for jurors to consider the value and applicability of the law to a
particular defendant, the law is unable to account for shifting communal values,
becoming overly rigid and, perhaps, meaningless to the community it seeks to
regulate. Jury nullification, then, is an opportunity for the expansion of demo-
cratic principles beyond the formalized government. The democracy, and indeed
the underlying goals of the criminal-justice system, is best served when criminal
processes allow forums for dissenting perspectives and when juries are allowed
to assess both the legal and factual bases of guilt.
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INTRODUCTION
Now more than ever, juries matter. As our nation struggles to define its
criminal process in the face of internal and external challenges, political,
judicial, and scholarly debates place the proper role of the jury squarely at the
center. With the Supreme Court's recent line of decisions beginning with
Apprendi v. New Jersey,' the power of twelve, ordinary citizens seated as jurors
has grown, as manifested by upended sentencing regimes at the federal and state
levels and a torrent of scholarly commentary. Now more than ever, juries
matter.
Juries offer a unique opportunity for the citizenry to redeem a system of law
confronted and confounded by competing community values and narratives.2
This Article reexamines Apprendi's embrace of the jury's historical role to
arrive at a novel understanding of the jury's function and purpose in our
constitutional polity. Properly conceived, the jury is more than the sum of its
parts-more than the twelve ordinary citizens who sit in judgment in a single
case. The Court in the Apprendi case line recasts the jury as an organic
mechanism for citizen interpretation that completes the law and enables an
otherwise static system to respond with equal clarity to moments mundane and
monumental. The Court has recreated a jury that serves a historic function to
check the power of government and to force the law to answer to the values of
1. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
2. See Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2009 Term-Foreword: Federalism All the Way
Down, 124 HARv. L. REv. 4, 31 (2010) (embracing the jury as a source of "democratic feedback").
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the governed. This vision of the jury is complete only when jurors are free to
assume their historical role as judges of both law and fact. And so, in this vision
of the jury, the question of nullification inevitably looms large.
Jury nullification-the process by which a jury renders a verdict on the
jurors' assessment of the law, and not the facts alone-has long been debated.
This phenomenon was once accepted, even lauded, in the Anglo-American legal
tradition. But, in 1895, the Supreme Court forbade juror consideration of the
law in federal court, and most state courts followed suit. Nonetheless, scholars
recircle to jury nullification periodically to reexamine it through the lenses of
various legal theories. Proponents tout it as a means of social change, and
detractors decry it as destroying the social order. Whether praised or damned,
jury nullification hovers, omnipresent, on the edge of the legal conscience and
legal scholarship.
With the same if not higher frequency, some new defendant steps forward to
cry out for nullification-from revolutionary colonists (before the Constitution
was even set to paper) to abolitionists, to white supremacists, to anarchists, to
the Chicago 8, to antiwar activists, to the Unabomber, to statutory rapists, to
African-American narcotic possessors in D.C., to Zacharias Moussaoui, to
countless others. Theirs is a motley crew joined together by a common belief
that their crime should not be judged as others' but as something more-a
political act. They call upon the jury to stand in an act of defiance and
redemption and to redefine the law, or at least its application to them-to
nullify. Their reasons may differ (as may their means and degrees of success),
but they rise without fail in courtrooms across the country and throughout
history, sounding a call for revolution to people so ordinary that they draw their
power from no source other than that they were chosen to be jurors.
These defendants ask the jury to create a law that exists not as some scripture
handed down whole and holy from on high but as a body that requires
sanctification through a process of interpretation and construction of meaning.
These defendants ask the jury to assign a meaning to the law that did not exist
before. They seek to redefine the law through nullification in terms of the
defendant's life and narrative-not merely as a static writing, demanding
mechanical application upon finding of certain facts. In this process, the mo-
ment of legal interpretation moves outside the sterile vacuum of the legislative
and judicial branches, with all their order and formality, to a less-well-defined
world of human life.3
Their call to nullify is messy. It is, by necessity, a call to expand the criminal
and judicial process beyond the words of the positive law, to a larger meaning
(however the community may define that meaning as it seeks to apply the
words). It is a call to force the process to embrace those who may never have
been considered, much less condoned or blessed, in the name of something
3. See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARv. L. REv. 4, 6-9 (1983).
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higher than the uniform application of the written law.
Those who have characterized nullification as a rebellion from the law are
right. The lives and narratives of these defendants are, by their very definition, a
challenge to the "ordered" system that stands in judgment of them. But that is
not the whole story. Nullification is also a call to instill a different kind of order,
one that accepts the fluid possibilities of the law-the ability of the law, through
juror interpretation, to encompass competing values and narratives and judge
them.
Across the country, individual jurors and whole juries heed the call. At least
some of them do-not as frequently as the scholars who write about them or the
defendants who bid them, but still enough to draw notice. They stand in
defiance of jury instructions to weigh only the facts and, instead, return verdicts
that confound judges and mesmerize the academy because they seem to fly in
the face of what they know of the law itself. Sometimes we laud these juries as
brave heroes striking a blow against oppression.' Other times history shakes its
collective head at them, aghast at their unblinking endorsement of the prejudice
or oppression around them.5 Jurors may free the patriot printer who truthfully
criticizes a corrupt governor,6 but they may also free the white men who lynch
an African-American man for no greater crime than defying the social order.7
Like the defendants who call on them to exercise their power, these "renegade"
jurors share noble and ignoble company. Yet there they are, in and out of
history, nullifying with and without permission, relatively undisturbed by the
swirl of scholarship and judicial consternation that surrounds their action. Jury
nullification would seem an omnipresent (but currently unofficial) part of the
American judicial system.
But something is changing in criminal court-or has come again-to raise
anew the question of whether it is time for jury nullification to reclaim a
recognized and even embraced role in the American judicial and political body.
This something is a reconception of the jury's role that began to gain momen-
tum with the Supreme Court's 2000 decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey.8
Simply put, Apprendi holds that the Constitution requires any fact used as a
basis for punishment to be proven to a jury using a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
standard.9 This notion hardly seems revolutionary, or even relevant to the
question of jury nullification. First, the Anglo-American legal tradition has long
4. See infra notes 59-62, 101 and accompanying text.
5. See MicHAL R. BELKNAP, FEDERAL LAW AND SouTHERN ORDER 20, 25, 32, 54-55, 120-24, 189
(1987) (discussing the historical use of jury nullification as a means of indemnifying those who
committed acts of racial violence).
6. See infra notes 51-70 and accompanying text.
7. See JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JuRY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRAcY 22-23
(1994).
8. See 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
9. See id. at 476-77 ("[Any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty
for a crime must be... proven beyond a reasonable doubt." (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S.
227, 243 n.6 (1999))).
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clung to the dual procedural ideal that sufficient proof of the facts to a jury
legitimates a conviction and so the criminal sanction. Second, the Apprendi line
mandates jury consideration of facts, not law.
This initial reaction overlooks Apprendi's important theoretical underpin-
nings, however. Apprendi and its progeny mandate jury consideration of facts
that support sanctions because the jury's consideration of the basis of the
defendant's sentence legitimates the conviction and, so, the criminal sanction.
Apprendi rests on the historical principle that, at the moment of the verdict, the
written law is made whole in its application to the governed and their accep-
tance of this application. If the citizenry is unable to participate in this applica-
tion, then the process, which is designed to embody the values of the community
and to enforce its collective will, becomes static, mechanical, and unable to
account for those it seeks to represent. Apprendi embraces the jury's role as a
"guard against a spirit of oppression and tyranny on the part of rulers [and to
function] as the great bulwark of [our] civil and political liberties."10 Jurors
cannot possibly perform this function if their hands (and minds) are inextricably
tied by the dictates of those same rulers."
Moreover, the Apprendi line squarely rejects the use of legalistic distinctions
to erode the jury's power. In the pre-Apprendi world, that power was often
restricted on the theory that certain issues involved "sentencing factors" re-
served for the court, rather than "elements" of the criminal offense that were the
purview of the jury. Apprendi rebuffed this purported distinction in the clearest
possible terms, noting that "the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of
effect."'12 Likewise, the logic of Apprendi undermines any attempt to prohibit
jury nullification based on the distinction between fact (the prerogative of the
jury) and law (the prerogative of legislatures and courts). The "effect" of both
fact and law on a defendant's ultimate punishment is unquestionable.13
In all this, the Apprendi case line pushes back against the mechanization of
the criminal-justice system and recognizes the vital role the jury plays in
animating the law at the moment the static word is applied to the living
10. Id. at 477 (second alteration in original) (quoting 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTrrUTION
OF THE UNrrED STATES 540-41 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 4th ed. 1873)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
11. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306-07 (2004) ("The jury could not function as
circuitbreaker in the State's machinery of justice if it were relegated to making a determination that the
defendant at some point did something wrong, a mere preliminary to a judicial inquisition into the facts
of the crime the State actually seeks to punish.").
12. 530 U.S. at 494.
13. One could question whether the distinction between law and fact can be meaningfully made as a
matter of "form." See Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 859, 863 (1992) (noting
agreement among legal theorists that "the law-fact distinction, whatever its utility, is purely a creature
of convention"). See generally Walter Wheeler Cook, Statements of Fact in Pleading Under the Codes,
21 COLUM. L. Rav. 416 (1921) (arguing that the boundary between fact and law is not as clear as many
presume).
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defendant. 14 That Apprendi and its progeny find support in the historical view of
the jury's role in society is no surprise. But in resurrecting the jury's review of
the factual basis of assessments of guilt, the Court inevitably opened the door to
reviving the historical vision of jurors as judges of both law and fact. That is, it
paved the way for legitimizing jurors as (potential) nullifiers.
This recognition necessitates a fundamental shift in how we conceptualize
jury nullification. Nullification itself is a charged word. It is perceived as an
illegitimate act of defiance-when a juror refuses to enforce a law and so usurps
the rightful power of traditional branches of government to construct and
designate law. But this vision of the law, and the act of nullification, is premised
on the assumption that the juror's exercise of the power to judge law is
illegitimate or rogue. Apprendi opens another possibility. The Constitution's
guarantee of a right to a jury trial in criminal cases can also be read as creating a
forum to redefine the law itself. It shifts the process of legal creation away from
the formal branches of government, which act in an atmosphere of political
expediency and compromise and without the ability to predict perfectly the
universe of real-life situations to which the law might apply.
1 5
Instead (at least at the moment of a criminal trial), Apprendi plants that
authority directly with the citizenry, whose values evolve with the ever-shifting
realities of daily life. So when jurors refuse to convict a defendant because they
believe the law unjust (either generally or as applied), they exercise their proper
power and role-to check the formal government and to give the law meaning
through their interpretation. Under this new vision, nullification is not a subver-
sion of government but is itself the exercise of a governmental function. The
law is thus recast as a fluid source of authority that draws strength both in its
formal construction and in its less formalized application in individual cases.
Now, more than ever, this matters. As the criminal-justice system faces increas-
ing challenges to its legitimacy from accused terrorists, political protesters, and
other "dissenters," the system's capacity to encompass uch voices and to create
a forum for the defense of dissent has become more critical.
This Article examines the role of the jury in a post-Apprendi justice system
14. See, e.g., Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 264-66 (2009) (maintaining the Court's
rejection of a mechanized application of sentencing guidelines); Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S.
85, 90-91, 100-01, 107-08 (2007) (noting that post-Booker judges must consider the fairness of the
sentence as applied and avoid sentences based on a mathematical formulae); Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 47 (2007) (upholding departures from sentencing guidelines by trial judges and rejecting
mechanical application of a formulaic method of sentencing); Nancy Gertner, Supporting Advisory
Guidelines, 3 HAv. L. & POL'Y REv. 261, 269 (2009) ("Booker appeared to toll the death knell for
passive, mechanical sentencing and to reintroduce judicial discretion into the equation."); Douglas A.
Berman, Reasoning Through Reasonableness, 115 YALE L.J. PocKET PAwR 142, 142 (2006), http://
thepocketpart.orglimages/pdfs/7.pdf (noting that post-Booker judges must now think through cases
"about how best to achieve the sentencing goals" as opposed to mechanically applying the sentencing
guidelines).
15. See generally James Forman, Jr., Essay, Juries and Race in the Nineteenth Century, 113 YALE
L.J. 895, 899-901 (2004) (hypothesizing that abolitionists relied upon juries to remedy what they
perceived as an imperfect political compromise in the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793).
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and its implications for jury nullification. I begin in Part I by recounting the rise
and fall of jury nullification in the Anglo-American legal system. Part II
considers nullification's continued resilience despite federal and most state
courts' best efforts to "outlaw" it. Part III argues that the jury is now experienc-
ing a second coming, a revival that has roots in the Warren Court's re-embrace
of the jury and has only expanded with the Supreme Court's decisions in the
Apprendi case line. In Part IV, I conclude that Apprendi shifts not only notions
of what qualify as "elements" of criminal offenses but also notions of what the
criminal law is and, so, what it means to "nullify" that law. In revitalizing the
jury's role, Apprendi recognizes the law as a living body that seeks to encom-
pass communal values and experience within it. Law under this theory is not
only what has been written but also what has been embraced by the community.
Often the two are one in the same, but, at those moments of divergence, the
democracy-and indeed the underlying goals of the system-is best served
when forums for dissenting perspectives are embraced, and when juries are
allowed to assess both the legal and factual bases of guilt.
I. THE RISE AND FALL OF JURY NULLIFICATION
Jury nullification was conceived in rebellion and free exercise of conscience.
Jurors who nullify do more than weigh the facts before them-they question
either the legitimacy of the law itself or the legitimacy of its application to a
particular defendant.16 In the process, their verdict is imbued with a power
previously absent-to define not just whether an act is criminal but what acts
can be criminalized and how. In this, there are two ways to view nullification.
The first, traditional approach is that nullification defies the law. The second is
that nullification challenges the definition of the "law" itself, pushing the
concept of the law toward less formalized forums in which community values
sway in the face of competing narratives. As will be discussed further in Part IV,
juror consideration of the law is properly understood as a balance between the
social interest in the orderly and consistent application of the law and the
narratives of particular defendants and the democratic tradition of dissent.17
Through this balance, jurors redefine notions of the law itself, instilling it with a
16. See Paul Butler, Essay, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice
System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 705 (1995) (arguing that the opportunity for nullification is an opportunity
to apply morality).
17. See Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 Am. L. REv. 12, 18 (1910) (describing
nullification as both "U]ury lawlessness" and "the great corrective of law in its actual administration");
see also KENT GREENAWALT, CoNFLicrs OF LAw AND MoRALrrY 363-67 (1987) (characterizing nullification
as the antithesis of the rule of law but vital to notions of justice and fairness); W. Neil Brooks &
Anthony N. Doob, Justice and the Jury, 31 J. Soc. IssuEs 171, 172 (1975) (acknowledging the political
nature of the jury, which draws power from its ability to "construe or ignore a relevant rule of law in a
case in which its application would not be in accord with the [community's] notions of justice and
fairness"); Alan Scheflin & Jon Van Dyke, Jury Nullification: The Contours of a Controversy, 43 LAW
& CoreMsP. PROBS. 51, 88 (1980) (suggesting that nullification is necessary to preserve the flexibility
and vitality of the law).
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meaning that flows directly from the citizenry and, for better or worse, achieves
community goals unfettered by legislative or executive compromise and pro-
cess. In short, they seek to answer the question of what the law is.
Nullification arose not only as a means of defining justice in the microcosm
of the trials in which it occurred but also as a cause crl~bre against perceived
oppression. It rose on a tide of communal support, only to ebb with the fear that
juries, with all their individual imperfections and prejudices, would tear the law
asunder. In the United States, during a period of a little over a century, it was
transformed from a point of agreement among the contentious Founders to a
point of contention among the three branches of government. Ultimately, the
Supreme Court attempted to officially ban it.
A. JURY NULLIFICATION IN ENGLAND
Like much of American legal history, the story of jury nullification begins in
England. In English law there was no formal or codified right of nullification,
but jurors found it anyway.8 From the perspective of legal historians, the story
begins on September 1, 1670 in the Old Bailey courtroom in London.19 Two
Quakers, William Penn and William Mead, were to stand trial for unlawful
assembly and breach of the peace.20 Neither man denied that he had been
involved in actions that established the elements of the crimes for which they
stood accused.21 They readily admitted that they had preached to other Quakers
in public-the basis of the indictment-but they challenged the indictment's
legality.22 When pressed by the judge, however, Penn declined to admit that
Mead or he had broken any laws.23 Rather, he asked the jurors to weigh whether
those laws were just.24 He challenged the judge to produce the law upon which
his indictment was based.25 When the judge responded that it was the "common-
law," Penn argued that "if the common law be so hard to be understood, it is far
from being very common."26
Penn's defense strategy that the indictment itself, or the law the indictment
was based on, was invalid was attractive given the apparent factual support for a
18. See Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United
States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 874 (1994).
19. See CATHERINE OWENS PEARE, WILLIAM PENN: A BIOGRAPHY 112 (1957); see also THOMAS ANDREW
GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL JuRY 1200-
1800, at 221-22 (1985) (discussing the trial of William Penn and William Mead).
20. See The Trial of William Penn and William Mead, at the Old Bailey, for a Tumultuous Assembly:
22 Charles H. A.D. 1670, in 6 COBBETT's COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 951, 954-55 (London,
R. Bagshaw 1810) [hereinafter COBBETr'S].
21. See id. at 958.
22. See id. at 958-59.
23. See id. When the court inquired whether, in light of his admission, Penn was admitting he was
guilty as charged, he replied that the question was not "whether I am Guilty of this Indictment, but
whether this Indictment be legal." Id.
24. See id. at 959-60.
25. See id. at 958.
26. See id. at 958-59.
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finding of guilt. Penn argued to the jury that he was not guilty despite the
damning, conceded facts because the laws of the State could not and should not
trump a man's ability to do God's will. 27 Penn's theory also put into play the
question of whether he possessed the requisite intent under the statute. To
Penn's way of thinking, an assembly in the name of worship lacked intent to be
unlawful because those who gathered did not mean to do harm or violence in
their assembly.28 According to the judge (or at least his recorded jury instruc-
tions), the law was clear that Penn's act of preaching and gathering a large
crowd, regardless of his purpose, was sufficient to prove guilt, and the jury need
not reach the question of Penn's intent.29 But to Penn, the law required more.
Under Penn's theory, the jury could still acquit him even if they found he had
violated the State's law, by nullifying those laws in favor of allowing citizens to
adhere to their individual calls to do God's will-in Penn's case, by preaching
on the street to the gathered crowd.
Thus Penn urged the jury to set aside the court's law and impose a higher
standard-that of morality and conscience. This argument was hardly novel.
And it would likely have evaded historical notice, had Penn's jurors not been
equally willing to assert their own consciences, and had Penn's judge not opted
to suppress the perceived rebellion of conscience in his courtroom in the interest
of law and order.30 After much back and forth with the judge, and a period of
incarceration without food or drink, the jury acquitted both men of all charges.3'
The judge had no choice but to accept the verdict, but, incensed, "he charged all
of the jurors for returning a verdict contrary to the evidence and contrary to his
instructions.,32 The jurors were fined forty marks each and sent to Newgate
Prison until the fine was paid.33 Not to be cowed by the judge's insistence that
the law of the State trumped each man's conscience, Edward Bushell and three
27. See id. at 958-60. Penn actually never got to finish his defense. He was banished to the bale
dock by the judge who found him to be "pestilent." See id. at 959. As he exited the courtroom, Penn
urged the jury to disregard the judge's admonition that they were only to judge facts, and to let their
consciences be the guide. See id. In a pamphlet Penn wrote after the trial describing his experience, he
stated that the essence of the defense he was trying to present to the jury was that "worship[ping] God
can never be a crime, no meeting or assembly, designing to worship God, can be unlawful." Id. at
970-71.
28. See id. at 971.
29. See id. at 960-61 (containing the judge's jury instruction that the law was fixed and the jury
needed only determine whether Penn preached, not his intention in preaching).
30. See ABRAMSON, supra note 7, at 71-73 (recounting the ongoing battle between Penn's jury and
the judge); Simon Stem, Note, Between Local Knowledge and National Politics: Debating Rationales
for Jury Nullification After Bushell's Case, 111 YAu L.J. 1815, 1822 (2002) (noting that Quakers were
"frequent targets of religious persecution" at this time and that they tended to proceed on defenses of
"freedom of conscience").
31. See GREEN, supra note 19, at 221-36 (recounting the various arguments made at trial); John A.
Phillips & Thomas C. Thompson, Jurors v. Judges in Later Stuart England: The Penn/Mead Trial and
Bushell's Case, 4 LAW & INEQ. 189, 194-215 (1986) (detailing the events leading to trial and the trial
itself); COBBMrr's, supra note 20, at 966-69.
32. See Stem, supra note 30, at 1823.
33. See id.
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other jurors refused to pay the fine, went to prison, and appealed their incarcera-
tion.34 Here, finally, the story gains historical momentum.35
In what became known as Bushell's Case, Chief Justice Sir John Vaughn
ruled that jurors could not be fined and imprisoned for their verdicts.36 His
opinion stressed the need for independence as a means of legitimating the jury
system.37 Vaughn pointed out that questions of law and fact are not always
clear, and that courts must bow to jurors' perceptions of evidence if jury
verdicts are ever to muster public support.38 Without such deference, the courts
risk undermining the value of the jury verdict itself-a societal assessment of
culpability that stands independent of the dictates of the court.
3 9
The irony of the Bushell case is twofold. First, there is no way to tell with
certainty the basis of the jury's verdict in Penn's trial. Today, Penn's argument
to the jury would be characterized as one for nullification. As Vaughn's opinion
notes, however, it is possible that the jury did follow the judge's instructions but
nonetheless concluded that the evidence did not support a guilty verdict.40 The
trial judge's belief that the evidence pointed overwhelmingly toward guilt did
not deprive the jury of its power to independently consider that evidence.
People's perceptions of the simplest facts-much less complex legal concepts-
frequently conflict with one another. In this sense, the Penn verdict may
constitute little more than a Rashamonesque disagreement over facts, not an
extralegal rebellion by the jury.
This reveals Bushell's second irony. For all his talk of jury independence,
Vaughn's opinion never recognized any official right of juries to decide ques-
tions of law, or for defendants like Penn to implore juries to do so.41 On its face,
Bushell stands for nothing more than the proposition that jurors cannot be
punished for acquitting a defendant.42 This is no small proposition, and it does
signal both the value of the jury and the jury's independence from the bench.
But Vaughn stopped considerably short of endorsing jury nullification. Yet the
Bushell decision is evoked as a milestone for jury nullification's legitimacy.
43
34. See id.
35. See id. at 1815 n.2 (discussing the historical significance of the Bushell's Case).
36. See Bushell's Case, (1670) 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P.) 1007.
37. See id. at 1010.
38. See id. As will be discussed further in Part Ill, courts (and advocates) struggle with the conflation
of law and fact. The Court in Apprendi has pushed back on the concept that there is a binary
construction of fact and law and that there are findings too complex for jury consideration.
39. See id.
40. See GREEN, supra note 19, at 225 (noting that Penn believed the jurors had acquitted and refused
to pay the fine because of their adherence to their consciences over the tyranny of the law, but the
record is silent as to the basis for the jurors' original verdict or their subsequent decision to defy the
judge).
41. See Stem, supra note 30, at 1823-24 (pointing out that Vaughan engages in a "cryptic
discussion" of the juror's role vis-A-vis judgments of law that proponents of nullification would later
seize upon, even though nowhere does he vest in the jury the right to judge the law).




It is hard to know exactly why Bushell came to be read so broadly, but the
likely reasons are as complicated as the times from which the case sprang. First,
the verdict that landed Bushell in jail (and in the annals of history) was laced
with a narrative of political dissent, regardless of whether the jury intended it.
44
The case was fraught with politics from the outset, with significant ramifications
on individual free speech and religion. The defendants recognized this reality
and used the trial as a forum to raise their dissent.45 Penn argued in Mead and
his defense for a right of citizens to disagree with the government and to rely on
higher authorities of conscience.46 This challenge to the government was politi-
cal dissent encompassing a right of the citizen to claim and name his or her own
concept of morality in the face of a state-sanctioned one-to redefine the law
from the bottom up, in the terms of the citizens it governed.47
Given these beginnings, it was not a far leap to cast the Penn jury's verdict-
regardless of its true basis-as an act of political dissent itself.48 The jury is thus
enshrined as a political actor capable of standing between an all-powerful state
and an oppressed citizen and recreating the law.4 9 In this incarnation, the jury
became more than mere citizens weighing the culpability of a fellow citizen; the
jury came to occupy a political space. Jurors took on the power to define the law
in their verdicts, either by declining to convict any defendant under that
particular law or by declining to accept the application of the law to a particular
defendant. This offered an opportunity for the jury to rebel not only against an
oppressive government but also against an oppressive and often foreign major-
ity who sought to impose its will on the jurors' community without regard to the
effect or desirability of such an imposition.
Thus, the juror's duty encompassed not only parsing the evidence to arrive at
facts but also judging the law through which those facts are channeled. This
assessment of the law was refined and sharpened by the juror's own conscience,
molded and forged in the community he or she represented-the same commu-
nity allegedly wronged by the defendant's illegal actions and affected by the
juror's disregard of the law. If Penn's trial judge seemed a petty dictator lording
over his narrow fiefdom of a courtroom, the Bushell decision came to be
understood as exalting the juror as a worthy barometer of what was truly just
and moral in the face of the unsanctioned power of the law. This vision of the
jury is one of ultimate democracy, if only on a microcosmic level.50 And so the
44. See GREEN, supra note 19.
45. See COBBrr's, supra note 20, at 959-60.
46. See GREEN, supra note 19, at 225 (discussing Penn's conclusions from the case, in which he
argued the jurors had decided the law for themselves).
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See CoBBr's, supra note 20, at 963-64.
50. As will be discussed further in Part IV, this notion of the juror as an everyman may be
problematic, particularly as one scrolls back through the Anglo-American law's not-so-proud history of
restrictions (both formal and informal) on who may serve (and who deserves to serve) as the
community's representative to the court. The troubling nature of such exclusive restrictions does not
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concept of jury nullification was born and sanctified.
B. JURY NULLIFICATION IN AMERICA
It is not hard to imagine that this vision of populist juries and justice was
attractive to American colonists who viewed themselves as bound by an overbear-
ing and distant ruler. The trial of John Peter Zenger in 1735 exemplified the role
of jury nullification in the colonies.51 Zenger, a printer of the New York Weekly
Journal, was charged with seditious libel.52 The charges stemmed from Zenger's
publication of articles alleging that "the colony's royal governor had dismissed
the chief justice of the New York Supreme Court [in retribution] for [the
justice's] ruling against him in a personal equity case."53 While Zenger's
accusations were apparently true, the court nonetheless instructed the jury that
truth was not a defense to the crime of seditious libel.54 Seditious libel was
defined as "written censure" of a public official.55 Given that there was no
factual dispute that the articles in question constituted written censure, the judge
found them to be seditious libel as a matter of law. The jury was left to
deliberate only whether Zenger had in fact published the articles themselves and
whether they referred to the governor. For all intents and purposes, the judge
had issued a directed verdict of guilty.
But Zenger's defense attorney urged the jury to disobey the instruction of the
court and instead render a verdict on whether the laws of England could
criminalize truthful criticism of the government.56 He told the judge that the
jurors "have the right beyond all dispute to determine both the law and the fact,
and where they do not doubt of the law, they ought to do so. '' 57 He continued
that jurors ought "to see with their own eyes, to hear with their own ears, and to
necessarily skew the people's understanding of the jury's proper institutional role. After all, restrictions
on juries often mirrored those on other forms of representative government (such as voting or property
ownership). See infra notes 183, 217-22 and accompanying text.
51. See ABRAMsoN, supra note 7, at 75.
52. See JAMES ALExANDER, A BREF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER, PRINTER
OF THE NEw YORK WEEKLY JOURNAL 1 (Stanley Nider Katz ed., 1963); 'MR. ZENGER'S MALICE AND
FALSHOOD': Six IssuEs OF THE NEW-YORK WEEKLY JOURNAL 1733-34, at 5 (Stephen Botein ed., 1985).
53. See ABRAMSON, supra note 7, at 73-74. For a thorough summary of the Zenger case, see
Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 18, at 872 (explaining that, in addition to the political nature of Zenger's
charge, Zenger had been held on "unprecedented and unattainable" bail prior to trial, which only
heightened the sense of government oppression and judicial manipulation that surrounded the trial).
54. See ALEXANDER, supra note 52, at 62. Zenger's judge instructed, "It is far from being a
justification of a libel, that the contents thereof are true ... since the greater appearance there is of truth
in any malicious invective, so much the more provoking it is." Id. at 74. The court concluded that the
only question before the jury was whether Zenger had in fact published the accounts. See id.
55. See SHANNON C. STMsON, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN THE LAW: ANGLO-AMERICAN JURISPRU-
DENCE BEFORE JOHN MARSHALL 23 (1990) (referencing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAws OF ENGLAND *150-51 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1769)) (internal quotation marks omitted)
("[S]editious libel [made it criminal to publish] 'written censure upon any public man whatsoever for
any conduct whatsoever, or upon any law or institution whatever'.").
56. See ALEXANDER, supra note 52, at 96.
57. Id. at 78.
[Vol. 100:657
JURY'S SECOND COMING
make use of their own consciences and understandings in judging of the lives,
liberties or estate of their fellow subjects.58
Zenger's defense was more nuanced than Penn's (or at least it is recorded as
such). On the one hand, Zenger's lawyer took no issue with the court's
recitation of the law of seditious libel but nonetheless urged the jury to find the
law unjust, at least as applied to truthful criticisms of the government.59 In this
sense, Zenger's defense was similar to Penn's because it urged the jury to set
aside the laws of England and to adhere to a higher law-"their own con-
sciences and understandings."60 On the other hand, Zenger's lawyer suggested
that the problem was not the law itself but rather the judge's improper character-
ization of the law as criminalizing truthful criticism of government officials.
61
In this argument, Zenger's lawyer urged the jury to disregard the incorrect
judicial instruction and find on their own that English common law permitted
speech such as Zenger's (or at least found it defensible in the face of charges of
seditious libel). Either version of Zenger's defense required the jury to make
some finding of law that the court had tried to reserve for itself-whether
Zenger's publications met the legal definition of libel. When the jury returned a
verdict of not guilty, they were hailed as heroes who had struck a blow against
oppression and colonial rule. The Pennsylvania Gazette reported, "If it is not
law it is better than law, it ought to be law, and will always be law wherever
justice prevails.6 2 Even if the jury lacked the formal power to judge the law
and even if they did get the law wrong, for these newspaper publishers on the
front line of a very real struggle to claim autonomy and freedom from oppres-
sive colonial rule, they got it so right.
In pre-Revolutionary America, Zenger's case was not completely unusual.6 3
Like Bushell, it was a product of its time. To those living in the American
colonies, the seditious-libel laws would have seemed yet another example of a
distant law enforced by an absent and arbitrary ruler who showed little sympa-
thy for the everyday experiences of his subjects.64 As colonists became more
frustrated by this distant law and demeaning rule, juries in criminal trials
became a vehicle to express dissent with the law itself.65 Verdicts became a
means to convey a powerful political message of citizen support for the
dissenter and so to reconstruct the law.66 Tales of jury nullification became part
58. Id. at 93.
59. See id. at 99.
60. Id. at 93.
61. See id. at 78-79.
62. Id. at 28.
63. See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 18 (noting the frequency during the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries of libel prosecutions in England and, to a lesser extent, in America).
64. See id. (noting that, despite the frequency of prosecutions, there were few convictions for
seditious libel in America as compared to the hundreds of convictions in England).
65. See LEONARD W. LEvy, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 17 (1985).
66. Cf. id. (noting occasions of grand juries refusing to issue indictments for libel).
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of the revolutionary folklore.6 7 Jurors joined the likes of Zenger and others who
rose in political opposition to colonial rule; they rejected both the state of the
law and efforts to criminalize those who opposed the law.68 And, thanks to
Bushell, they did so with immunity. They could offer shelter to Zenger's
publication without any prospect of punishment themselves. Juries gave ordi-
nary people in extraordinary times the opportunity to define the laws of their
community not only in formalistic terms but also in functional terms. As jurors,
the ordinary were made powerful precisely for their ability to represent commu-
nity values and define the law in those terms.
From the perspective of revolutionary (or even just dissenting) defendants,
the courtroom became a forum to promote the ideals of the cause and to argue
the politic of the law. For the jurors it may not have been so radical. They need
not have been prepared to join the revolution to conclude that Zenger's convic-
tion would do violence to their notions of justice, liberty, and even their very
autonomy as men and citizens.69 It is not hard to imagine that jurors considered
not only the life and liberty of the defendant on trial before them but also the
effect of their verdict on their own lives. Would the conviction of Zenger mean
no person could criticize a government official, even when that official deserved
censure? In this sense, these verdicts reflected more than mere abstract or
formalistic views of liberty and justice; they were grounded in the lives of each
man in the courtroom.7 °
This vision of jurors and their role as political actors is present in the
Founders' discussion of the Constitution and the role of the law in post-
Revolutionary America.7' They conceived of the jury as the space where the
law met the governed and, in so doing, became whole.72 To the men writing and
67. This is underscored by the fact that none other than Alexander Hamilton rose to defend Zenger.
See ALEXANDER, supra note 52, at 61; see also ABRAMSON, supra note 7, at 23-25 (describing local juries
as resistance bodies with the likes of John Hancock using the jury to resist tyrannically rule).
68. See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 18.
69. In many colonies, juries served as bodies of resistance that allowed revolutionary actors to
continue to advocate. See JOHN PHILLIP REID, IN A DEFIANT STANCE: THE CONDmONS OF LAW IN
MASSACHUSETrS BAY, THE IRISH COMPARISON, AND THE COMING OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 27-28
(1977).
70. Notably absent in discussions of pre-Revolutionary juror nullification is the reality that the
jurors' empathy for the defendant or his or her cause likely hinged on the composition the jury itself.
Restrictions on juror eligibility may have actually facilitated verdicts such as Zenger but would have
likely produced different results for a defendant whose cause and life narrative was more divergent
from the jurors' experiences. The effect of the jurors' identities on verdicts was a fact not lost on
England; in response to frequent use of American juries to defy English colonial policy, England
extended the jurisdiction of admiralty courts, which sat without juries. See Alschuler & Deiss, supra
note 18, at 875.
71. The Declaration of Independence listed as one of its grievances the King's "depriving us ... of
the benefits of Trial by Jury." THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). By the time the
Sixth Amendment promised the right to a jury-fifteen years later-the notion of an active jury was
firmly entrenched in the post-Revolutionary psyche.
72. See 2 DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS 5 (L.H. Butterfield et al. eds., 1961) (in
responding to the question of whether jurors should be confined to deciding only questions of fact,
Adams wrote, "Every Man of any feeling or Conscience will answer, no. It is not only his right, but his
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contemplating the ratification of the Constitution, the jury was a forum where
justice emerged because citizens could decide the meaning of the law (as
opposed to having the meaning dictated to them by a judge or some other
formalized body such as a legislative or executive branch).7 3 In this vision, the
Duty in that Case to find the Verdict according to his own best Understanding, Judgment and
Conscience, tho in Direct opposition to the Direction of the Court.... The English Law obliges no
Man.. . to pin his faith on the sieve of any mere Man."). Adams wrote extensively about the role of the
jury, stating that "the common people, should have as complete a control... in every judgment of a
court of judicature" as they have in the other branches of government, and that it was "not only [the
juror's] right, but his duty.., to find the verdict according to his own best understanding, judgment,
and conscience, though in direct opposition to the direction of the court." 2 CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS,
Tm WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNrrED STmS 253-55 (Boston, Charles C. Little
& James Brown 1850). His vision of the jury was driven in no small part by his fear that judges "being
few... might be easily corrupted; being commonly rich and great, they might learn to despise the
common people, and forget the feelings of humanity, and then the subject's liberty and security would
be lost." THE REVOLUTIONARY WRITINGS OF JOHN ADAMS 55 (C. Bradley Thompson ed., 2000). In short,
he envisioned a jury described by Alexis de Tocqueville in 1835 that "teach[es] men the practice of
equity." ALEXIS DE ToCQUEvILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA AND Two ESSAYS ON AMERICA 320 (Gerald
Bevan trans., Penguin Books 2003) (1835).
73. Nowhere is this more evident than in the debates surrounding juror eligibility. Originally, the
Constitution held no requirement for local juries. See U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. Anti-Federalist
opponents of the Constitution seized on this omission, which was in sharp contrast to the common law's
requirement that juries be selected from the county where the crime occurred. See ABRAMSON, supra
note 7, at 22 (discussing Anti-Federalist reaction to the lack of a local jury requirement); BLACKSTONE,
supra note 55, at 344 (defining the common law term of vicinage to mean that jurors must be drawn
from "the county where the fact is committed"). The Anti-Federalist reasoned that, without local juries,
verdicts would no longer reflect the sentiment of the communities most affected by the alleged crime
and the judicial system could become a forum for tyranny. See ABRAMSON, supra note 7, at 22. To the
Anti-Federalist, the thought of removing a trial from the community in which the crime allegedly
occurred smacked of colonial tactics to try accused traitors in England in front of jurors more
sympathetic to the crown or at least less sympathetic to the colonies, as opposed to in America where
their treason allegedly had occurred. See id. at 22-23 (describing the British government's efforts to
quash the budding revolt by bringing colonists to England to be tried in front of "hostile jurors" and
perceptions among Anti-Federalists that the federal government's efforts to eradicate local jurors
amounted to little more than forum shopping).
In contrast, the Federalists advocated a broader jury pool in order to prevent conviction or acquittal
based on the juror's extrajudicial knowledge of the case. See id. at 26. This was particularly crucial to
those who recognized the tenuous state of the federal government. As James Madison noted, forces of
rebellion still existed and there were those who even post-Revolution were displeased with the
establishment of a centralized government. See 3 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEvERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF Tm FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL
CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, at 537 (J.B. Lippincott Co. 1907) (1836). Madison feared that to
require local juries in the trials of such rebels would end in disaster and ultimately result in disunion of
the federal government. See id.; see also 2 id. at 112-13 (noting that Massachusetts delegate Christo-
pher Gore argued that the continuation of the common law tradition of local juries risked inconsistent
and biased verdicts). In these debates, Jeffrey Abramson notes, there was an internal tension between
notions of what justice is and should be: should it be decided by local juries who truly reflected the
community's sense of culpability or should it be determined by juries drawn from farther afield who
were less likely to be biased and more likely to protect the new federal government? See ABRAMSON,
supra note 7, at 26.
In the midst of this debate, the most eloquent expression of this notion of the common man deciding
law was expressed in the Federalist writings themselves:
The most shining part, the most brilliant circumstance in honour of the framers of the
constitution is their avoiding all appearance of craft, declining to dazzle even the superstitious,
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law was not a static text but a moving one that depended on citizen interpreta-
tion, debate, and even dissention in order to survive.4 It was a true common
law.75 The ordinary man knew it and gave it meaning through his interaction
with it, the application of his own moral values upon it, and his acceptance of
it.76 Encompassed in this vision was a right of nullification.
To be sure, the Founders' vision does not appear in their writings as a
starry-eyed belief that law left to juries would result in utopic justice.77 They
expressed fear that allowing jurors to interpret laws would result in inconsistent
enforcement and seemingly arbitrary verdicts.78 But, in the end, the Founders
seemed to conclude that uniformity for uniformity's sake was not as lofty a goal
as creating a living body of law that embraced and was embraced by the
population it governed.79
In many ways, this is not that surprising. First, as discussed above, the
colonial experience of relying on citizen jurors to correct an overreaching
government would have still carried the appeal of a successful act of rebellion.8 °
Second, to the extent that it could be argued that such a corrective mechanism
by a hint about grace or ghostly knowledge. They come to us in the plain language of common
sense, and propose to our understanding a system of government, as the invention of mere
human wisdom; no deity comes down to dictate it, not even a god appears in a dream to
propose any part of it.
Letter by David, in 4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 246, 248-49 n.l (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981)
(quoting the essay of Elihu); see also Donald M. Middlebrooks, Reviving Thomas Jefferson's Jury:
Sparf and Hansen v. United States Reconsidered, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 353, 388 (2004) ("Revolution-
ary colonials refused to define law as an instrument of the state which could not be judged by the
common man. Rather, they viewed it as the reflection of their community which ordinary men were
equally capable of judging for themselves.")
74. See ELLIOT, supra note 73, at 545.
75. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON
MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830, at 3, 4 (Univ. of Ga. Press ed. 1994) (1975) (describing early
American law as a body known to the citizenry and the product of constant citizen interpretation and
application).
76. See Letter ofAgrippa IV, in THE COMPLETE ANTn-FEDERALIST, supra note 73, at 75, 76 (document-
ing both that the Founders' generation viewed jurors not only as fact-finders but also as a political
institution critical for a democracy).
77. In fact, some colonists lost faith in the jury system. See BRUCE H. MANN, NEIGHBORS AND
STRANGERS: LAW AND COMMUNITY IN EARLY CoNNECIncur 75-81 (1987); Bruce H. Mann, The Evolution-
ary Revolution in American Law: A Comment on J.R. Pole's "Reflections," 50 WM. & MARY Q. 168,
171 (1993).
78. See ELLIOT, supra note 73.
79. See ABRAMSON, supra note 7, at 30.
80. Such a sentiment is certainly present in the discussions of Patrick Henry and John Adams, both
of whom ascribed to the jury power to hold tyranny in check. See ELLOT, supra note 73, at 578-79 (for
Patrick Henry's position); DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 72 (for Adams'
sentiments). This vision of the jury seemed to be shared not only among members of the executive and
legislative branches but also by the immediately post-Revolutionary Judiciary Branch. Chief Justice
John Jay, sitting as a court of original jurisdiction in the 1794 case of Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 1 (1794), instructed the jury that they should judge both law and fact in reaching verdict. See id.
at 4. In constructing this instruction, he drew on a long tradition not only of instructing jurors of their
ability to nullify, but also of engaging in judicial encouragement of the nullification process. See
generally United States v. Polizzi, 549 F. Supp. 2d 308, 413-20 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), vacated, 564 F.3d 142
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was no longer necessary as America had escaped the yoke of colonial rule, the
concept of jurors giving meaning to law would have provided a compromise
between those who recognized the need for a strong central government, and
hence the Constitution, and those who feared the tyranny of a distant govern-
ment.81 Third, any concerns that the revolution would remove one elite ruling
class only to replace it with another would have been ameliorated by jurors'
ability to review the law and thus serve as a check on the newly established
government.82 It would ensure that the meaning of the criminal law in each
community reflected the values and perceptions of that community.83 It would
prevent overzealous or politically motivated prosecutors who might seek to
suppress opposition with baseless or flimsy criminal charges. It would check
legislatures in the event that they lost touch with the goals of the citizenry.84
And it would rein in an elite judiciary that might seek to use the courtroom as a
bully pulpit to forward a judge's own political, personal, or ideological ends.
Beyond this, allowing jurors to weigh both law and fact would have been
consistent with many of the Founders' (and indeed the citizens') notions of
law.85 Natural law was the dominant theory du jour. Under this theory, law was
not handed down but embodied in each man.86 Each person's common sense
and conscience was as legitimate a legal compass as a judge's edict or prec-
edent.87 The law sprang from the community it served, and the jury acted as the
guardian of the community's values in a forum in which the law directly
touched the citizen.88
In drafting the Constitution, the Founders cemented the role of the jury as a
political and constitutional actor. The right to a jury is the only right present in
both the body of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.9 For all the disagree-
(2d Cir. 2009) (describing the pre- and post-Revolutionary judicial instructions on nullification, which
sometimes encouraged nullification).
81. See ABRAMSON, supra note 7, at 33.
82. Cf Letter by David, supra note 73, at 246-48 (noting that while the business of government is to
enforce laws, such enforcement is predicated on the community's support of the law and acquiescence
to its enforcement in a particular way by the government).
83. See Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 17, at 68-69 (describing the jury as a "social barometer"
that measures the community's acceptance of the law).
84. See Federal Farmer No. 15, in 4 THE FOUNDERS' CoNsTnroN 397, 397 (Philip B. Kurland &
Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) ("The body of the people, principally, bear the burdens of the community;
they of right ought to have a controul in its important concerns, both in making and executing laws,
otherwise they may, in a short time, but ruined.").
85. See id. (arguing that law emanates from man and his conscience).
86. Cf THE FEoERALisT No. 62, at 349 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (warning that
laws had little value if they were either "so voluminous that they cannot be read, or so incoherent that
they cannot be understood").
87. See DiARY AND AtorBIOGRAPHY OF Jom ADAMS, supra note 72.
88. As will be discussed further in Part IV, the Founders' populist rhetoric was in tension with the
prevailing conventions that limited who could serve on juries and who, therefore, was an eligible vessel
of the law (as opposed to a mere subject of it).
89. See U.S. CoNsT. art. IlI, § 2, cl. 3 ("The trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment,
shall be by Jury .. "); id. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
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ments the Founders suffered in drafting the Constitution, they did not quarrel
over the wisdom of a robust jury system as a vital component of a democracy.9°
To the Founders, an independent jury was "at the heart of the Bill of Rights."9
Neither the Constitution nor the Bill of Rights explicitly addresses whether
jurors should weigh the law in reaching their verdict.92 But this is not to say that
the notion of jurors contemplating questions of law lacks constitutional sup-
port.93 First, the history of jury nullification in the colonies and the Founders'
expression of the role of jurors to render verdicts "according to his own best
Understanding, Judgment and Conscience, tho in Direct opposition to the
Direction of the Court' 94 support a conclusion that the jury they contemplated
was one free to decide independently questions of law as well as fact.95 Beyond
this, adoption of the Double Jeopardy Clause served not only to protect defen-
dants from repeated prosecution by an infinitely more powerful state but also to
protect jurors who were free to base their verdicts on assessments of law or fact
without risk of censure, or even inquiry, if the court deemed they got it wrong.96
In this sense, both the juror and the defendant may seek shelter in the Double
Jeopardy Clause; the prospect of jury nullification is codified and condoned.97
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed....").
90. Cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 257-58 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P Fairfield ed., Johns Hopkins
University Press 2d ed. 1981) (1966) ("The friends and adversaries of the plan of the convention, if
they agree in nothing else, concur at least in the value they set upon the trial by jury; or if there is any
difference between them it consist in this: the former regard it as a valuable safeguard to liberty; the
latter represent it as the very palladium of free government.").
91. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1183 (1991).
92. The Constitution is silent on the specifics of the jury, establishing only the defendant's right to
one. Just as it does not indicate whether jurors may consider questions of law in reaching their verdict,
it also does not stipulate that jurors may only consider facts in rendering a verdict. It is widely accepted
among scholars and members of the judiciary that the jury contemplated by the Founders was one that
considered both law and facts and enjoyed the power to nullify. See United States v. Polizzi, 549 F
Supp. 2d 308, 405 (E.D.N.Y 2008), vacated, 564 F.3d 142 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that at the time of
Sixth Amendment's adoption in 1791, the impartial jury was understood to enjoy "the power to refuse
to convict even if the facts and law indicated guilt").
93. See id.
94. See DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 72.
95. Even Supreme Court Chief Justice John Jay acknowledged this reality in Brailsford; he ex-
plained in his jury instruction that "both [questions of law and of fact] are lawfully, within your power
of decision." See Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1, 4 (1794); see also Mark DeWolfe Howe,
Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARv. L. REV. 582, 595 (1939) ("The power of the jury to judge of
the law in criminal cases is one of the most valuable securities guaranteed by the Bill of Rights"
(quoting Kane v. Commonwealth, 89 Pa. 522, 527 (1879))).
96. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. V; cf Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. 662, 669-70 (1896) (noting the
Double Jeopardy Clause prevents the court from reviewing the basis of the jury's acquittal); Sparf v.
United States, 156 U.S. 51, 105-06 (1895) (same).
97. Paul Butler argued:
The men who wrote the Constitution included an important safeguard against unjust criminal
laws-the right to trial by jury. Jurors were intended to relieve potential oppressiveness by the
government by not permitting the application of unjust laws. Modern jurisprudence has
attempted to limit jurors' exercise of their historical right to judge the law as well as the facts.
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Coupled with a lack of specificity in jury verdict forms and the acceptance of
inconsistent verdicts without further inquiry, jurors were (and are) free to render
verdicts on any basis they chose.98 This concept should sound familiar; the
promise of Bushell is that jurors, once selected, may render the verdict as they
see fit without risk of repercussions to their immediate selves.
C. CHALLENGES TO THE RIGHT OF JURIES TO NULLIFY
From here the story of jury nullification changes course. The government that
Zenger criticized had been replaced by revolution and then a democracy.99
Notions of the criminal law itself shifted from a natural, common law view to
The power remains, however, as a practical matter, because the Constitution's double jeopardy
clause prohibits judicial review of "not guilty" verdicts.
Paul Butler, By Any Means Necessary: Using Violence and Subversion To Change Unjust Law, 50
UCLA L. REv. 721, 739 (2003).
98. See United States v. Ogull, 149 F. Supp. 272, 275-76 (S.D.N.Y 1957) (acknowledging that
while there is no per se rule barring special verdict forms, instituting such forms "would partly restrict
[the jury's] historic function, that of tempering rules of law by common sense brought to bear upon the
facts of a specific case"); Howe, supra note 95, at 584 (noting "that the jury's right to return a general
verdict in criminal cases gives it only a power, and not a moral or legal right to determine the law upon
their own initiative regardless of the court's instruction"). Later, the adoption of the beyond-a-reasonable-
doubt standard in criminal law created further shelter for jury revolt. The standard is vague and
therefore open to wildly subjective interpretations. Jurors were free to return verdicts of acquittal based
on whatever "reasonable doubts" they harbored. See Simon A. Cole & Rachel Dioso-Villa, CSI and Its
Effects: Media, Juries, and the Burden of Proof, 41 NEw ENG. L. REv. 435, 466 (2007) (stating that
"beyond a reasonable doubt" is "a phrase that is well known to be vague, perhaps devoid of meaning in
and of itself, and enormously frustrating to jurors"); Larry Laudan, Is Reasonable Doubt Reasonable?,
9 LEGAL THEORY 295, 295, 315-16 (2003) (citing empirical research that demonstrates jurors are
confused by the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard and therefore use the standard in whatever way
they consider appropriate); Erik Lillquist, Recasting Reasonable Doubt: Decision Theory and the
Virtues of Variability, 36 U.C. DAvis L. Rev. 85, 111-17 (2002) (using empirical research to demonstrate
that jurors routinely vary the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt s andard); Lawrence M. Solan, Refocusing the
Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases: Some Doubt About Reasonable Doubt, 78 TEx. L. REv. 105, 134-46
(1999) (stating that because the reasonable-doubt standard is so vague, it often confuses, more than it
helps, jurors); Elisabeth Stoffelmayr & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Conflict Between Precision and
Flexibility in Explaining "Beyond a Reasonable Doubt," 6 PsYcHOL. PuB. PoL'y & L. 769, 779 (2000)
(concluding that jurors apply the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt s andard differently).
In addition, modem judicial standards in certain types of cases-obscenity, for example-still rely on
direct application of varying social standards to determine whether the material or act in question
constitutes protected speech. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 37 (1973); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378
U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (including the now-famous description of pornogra-
phy-"I know it when I see it"-which suggests that pornography, though capable of criminalization, is
incapable of description beyond individualized judgment).
99. See ABRAMSON, supra note 7, at 75 (arguing that to the extent cases like Zenger's were acts of
rebellion against an oppressive outside government, it was not clear post-Revolution what place
nullification could serve); CLAY S. CONRAD, JuRY NuLurtcATION: THE EvOLUtION OF A DOCrRNE 11
(1998); Butler, supra note 16, at 703 (noting that American courts by the mid-nineteenth century
"began to criticize the idea of jurors deciding justice); David N. Dorfman & Chris K. Iijima, Fictions,
Fault, and Forgiveness: Jury Nullification in a New Context, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 861, 873, 891
(1995).(noting that the post-Revolutionary zeal that supported nullification gave way to a desire to
preserve law and order).
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one that was more complicated, negotiated, and codified.)O This is not to say
that moments of jury nullification were not still lauded. Historians recount the
moral triumph of Northern juries refusing to convict abolitionists under the
Fugitive Slave Act as the triumph of an independent jury system.°1 But even
these recitations are told with the benefit of hindsight and the public-relations
mechanism of the victor. Contemporaries to these stories tell of greater conflict
about the efficacy of jurors weighing law.102 They question the ramifications to
a democracy when a small group of citizens can set aside the negotiated
agreement of a nation divided on the moral propriety of slavery. In this, they
embody the shift to define the law in more positive terms-the negotiation
codified by the written law-as opposed to something more fluid and requiring
community endorsement for legitimacy. Later, opponents of nullification would
stand these "triumphant" narratives beside the morally more suspect stories of
citizen jurors acquitting defendants of egregious crimes because the jurors could
do so without consequence. 1
0 3
100. See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 18, at 906-07 (noting that, as the nation grew more complex,
faith in common law shifted towards codified law); John H. Langbein, Chancellor Kent and the History
of Legal Literature, 93 CoLum. L. Rav. 547, 566-67 (1993) (describing the struggle to define law in the
United States following the Revolution, and the eventual adoption of codified law instead of common
law and common sense).
101. See United States v. Morris, 26 F. Cas. 1323 (C.C.D. Mass. 1851) (No. 15,815). After a public
rescue of a man named Frederick Jenkins from efforts to return him to Virginia and slavery, eight
abolitionists in Boston were charged with violating the Fugitive Slave Law, which prohibited aiding,
abetting, and assisting the escape of a fugitive slave. See ABRaMSON, supra note 7, at 80-82. The
defendants did not dispute the facts of the case but called on the jury to nonetheless acquit them
because the Fugitive Slave Act was unconstitutional. See Morris, 26 F. Cas. at 1331. They called on the
jury to consider a higher law, here the Constitution, and so disregard the judge's instructions. See id.
The judge ruled that jurors "have not the right to decide any question of law" and that "their duty and
their oath [was] to apply to the facts, as they may find them, the law given to them by the court." See id.
at 1336. In justifying his decision to give this instruction, the judge echoed the concerns of some of the
Founders, that without mandatory judicial instruction on the law, inconsistent verdicts would result. See
id. at 1332-33. Despite the judge's warning, the jury acquitted, and the case was hailed as a triumph of
justice over a morally corrupt law. See ABRAMSON, supra note 7, at 82. For discussion of similar cases,
see Paula L. Hannaford-Agor & Valerie P. Hans, Nullification at Work? A Glimpse from the National
Center for State Courts Study of Hung Juries, 78 CH.-KErc L. Rav. 1249 (2003).
102. Justice Story, sitting on a case involving the transport of slaves, told the jury:
I hold it the most sacred constitutional right of every party accused of a crime, that the jury
should respond as to the facts, and the court as to the law. It is the duty of the court to instruct
the jury as to the law; and it is the duty of the jury to follow the law, as it is laid down by the
court.
United States v. Battiste, 24 F. Cas. 1042, 1043 (C.C.D. Mass. 1835) (No. 14,545). Story further argued
that allowing jurors to convict or acquit a defendant based on the jurors' moral beliefs-as opposed to
the judge's instruction on the law-would threaten all defendants' rights and the very rule of law. See
id.
103. See CONRAD, supra note 99, at 167-86; W. William Hodes, Lord Brougham, the Dream Team,
and Jury Nullification of the Third Kind, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1075, 1089-90 (1996) (recounting
examples of Southern, all-white juries during the civil-rights movement of the 1960s acquitting the
admitted lynchers of African-American males from the post-Reconstruction-era South); see also Jeffrey
Abramson, Two Ideals of Jury Deliberation, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 125, 145-52; Andrew D. Leipold,
Response, The Dangers of Race-Based Jury Nullification: A Response to Professor Butler, 44 UCLA L.
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With this shift in the conception of the law, the characterization of jurors as
the champions of liberty and justice begins to unravel. Jurors come to be cast
instead as individuals acting without consequence, taking license to impose not
only community values but also community prejudices.0 At some point, the
larger community (say, the nation) has an interest in seeing the law enforced
evenhandedly, consistently, statically."0 5 Twelve citizens, no matter how "good"
their intentions, should not have the power to set that expectation aside. The
idea that the law is static and written, for all its shortcomings, promises a known
and knowable code of conduct. It provides notice to citizens of prohibited
actions and their consequences. It draws its strength from consistent and even
application. If citizens find the law no longer just or in conformity with their
own values, they have mechanisms to change it. 106 They need only convince
enough of their fellow citizens to join them in an act of legislative reform,
which is itself steeped in codified process.
Furthermore, the concept of what the law is shifted toward a more positivist
model. Notions of what was "just" or legal shifted from the conscience of the
everyman to a text of a written law that was negotiated, drafted, and approved
in the elite and formal circles of an elected government."7 With this shift,
REv. 109, 122-24 (1996); Nancy S. Marder, The Myth of the Nullifying Jury, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 877,
935-48 (1999); Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: "Racialism" and Reason, 95 MICH. L. REv. 723,
733-34 (1997) (highlighting the dangers of race-based jury nullification).
104. The judicial instructions given in both Battiste, see supra note 102 and accompanying text, and
Morris, see supra note 101 and accompanying text, highlight this shift. Both cases reveal Supreme
Court Justices' struggle with the question of whether the defendant and, secondarily, the community, is
better off when jurors are given the opportunity to judge the law. In both cases, Justices, sitting as trial
judges, concluded that consistent application of the law was more valuable than allowing jurors to
inject community values (or prejudices). This reasoning may also reflect the notion that, when such
controversial issues are in play, there is no common community value that could legitimately trump the
law as set forth by the formal branches of government. What Northern jurors may be willing to forgive
and even label a moral act (such as when they refuse to convict under the Fugitive Slave Act), Southern
"victims" would call criminal. In such a circumstance, it is less clear which community should have the
right to impose its values on the law.
105. See Thomas Regnier, Restoring the Founders'Ideal of the Independent Jury in Criminal Cases,
51 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 775, 807-11 (2011) (describing the rise of strict legalism in post-colonial
America as a means of promoting uniformity and consistency in the application of the law).
106. See NEIL ViDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN Jumas: THE VERDicr 226 (2007) (discussing
juror review of law as a means to check governmental power); see also ABRAMSON, supra note 7, at
82-84. Abramson discusses the debate in the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention f 1853
between opponents and proponents of nullification. Opponents feared that continued unchecked, juror
nullification would result in the imposition of community prejudice, not justice. In the end, voters
defeated the proposed amendment o allow nullification along with the rest of the proposed constitution,
but the nullification amendment was later ratified in substance via a statute that guaranteed the right of
juries to decide both law and fact. At the end of the day, concern over communal prejudice and
alternative avenues available for legal reform did not convince the legislative branch to abandon the
concept of community-based review of the law. See id.
107. See United States v. Polizzi, 549 F. Supp. 2d 308, 421 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), vacated, 564 F.3d 142
(2d Cir. 2009) (attributing the historical shift away from juror assessment of the law to waning faith in
diverse juries, the increased complexities of the law, the rise of a professional bar of attorneys, and a
belief that the country was shifting away from "common principles of morality, education and
dedication to the law").
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confidence in the ability of jurors to sort through the complexities of this written
law would have understandably waned. After all, jurors would now be consult-
ing not only their consciences in reaching a verdict but also various legal
tomes. '0 8
The body of the law and even the conception of law itself had shifted away
from the people to be governed, and toward a more exclusive body-the
government elected to rule over the people through written commands. A
cynical view would be that there was no better way to disempower the every-
man than to make the law so abstruse that the common folk could not figure it
out and so would not dare try to redefine it.'19 There is surely some truth to this,
but the motive behind this shift need not be so nefarious. The very people
drafting a rarified version of the law were the people who, only a few years
earlier, had made no value distinction between the juror's vision of the law and
a judge's or lawyer's vision.i 0 Despite this fact, they believed they had good
reason to distill the law in text as opposed to leaving it to the folly of the
everyman's conscience and the oral history of that conscience. In the creation of
text, there is a consistency and at least the possibility of a shared construction of
meaning. A written text claims legitimacy in its existence as a permanent and, at
times, immobile record of the community's will (at least at the time the law was
drafted). This stands in opposition to the notion of a fluid law drawing its
legitimacy from the community. The roles would be reversed, with the law now
dictating to the community whether the common values were legitimate and
sustainable, as opposed to the other way around.
As concepts of law itself changed, perception of the right to a jury may have
also evolved. Arguably, the Founders originally conceived of this right as
belonging to both the defendant and the community as represented by the
jury.1 ' A century later, courts and lawmakers began to think of the right to jury
in terms of the defendant's rights." 2 Without any stake (or at least a more
limited stake) in the right to the jury trial, the juror's claim to nullification was
diminished.
Whatever the cause, the tide began to turn by the second half of the 1800s,
with the courts leading the call to come about.' 3 In 1895, the Supreme Court
108. See id. at 405-06. Consider also the statement of Chancellor James Kent who, in recounting his
own judicial service in New York, stated, "[T]here were no reports or State precedents.... We had no
law of our own, and nobody knew what it was." WniLiAM KENT, M.moias AND LEmrERS OF JAMES KENT,
LL.D. 117 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1898).
109. Cf MORTON J. HoRwrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERIcAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 140--59 (1977)
(describing the "subjugation of juries" as part of an effort to make judicial proceedings more responsive
to commercial interests).
110. See Adams' Diary Notes on the Right of Juries, in 1 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 228, 230 (L.
Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel, eds., 1965). Adams, in arguing that jurors could decide law, noted that
there was little difference between jury law and lawyer's law. See id.
111. See Amar, supra note 91.
112. See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 18, at 892-93.




waded into the fray in Sparf v. United States.114 The Court acknowledged that
federal courts in earlier times may have told jurors that they were judges of law
and fact.'1 5 But times had changed. Jurors must be beholden to the law as
delivered to them by a judge in the jury instructions. Sparf reduced the jury to
the most formalistic of bodies, one with no more constitutional significance than
to serve as the "rubber stamp" to the judge's vision of the law.116 Three
generations after the ratification of the Constitution, the Court sacrificed the
right of the jury to consider the law at the altar of consistency and judicial
authority. 7
Not surprisingly, this vision of the jury did not sit well with everyone on the
Court. Two Justices filed lengthy dissents in which they argued that the constitu-
tional right to a jury must mean more than the right to burden twelve citizens
with the duty of being a rubber stamp to the judiciary.1 8 If this were the case,
why have a jury at all? A judge is perfectly capable, after all, of considering
evidence and rendering a verdict. The Constitution's promise of a jury, they
reasoned, must mean something more than warm bodies in the courtroom."9
But what? The dissenters harkened back to the Founders' ideals of the jury as
the last and best voice of the community giving meaning to and animating the
body that is the law.120 That they were passionate or colorful in their dissents
was no surprise-at stake was nothing less than the role of the jury in the
democracy.
The Court would revisit the holding in Sparf twenty-five years later in
Homing v. District of Columbia.12 1 In Homing, the Supreme Court found no
error in a judge's instruction to a jury that "a failure to bring in a [guilty] verdict
in this case can arise only from a willful and flagrant disregard of the evidence
and the law .... I cannot tell you in so many words to find defendant guilty, but
[a]fter 1850,. . . most of the courts that passed upon the question concluded that judges rather
than jurors should settle questions of law. Between 1850 and 1931, the courts of at least
eleven states (Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, New York,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Vermont, and Virginia) rejected the view that juries should judge
issues of law as well as fact.
Id.
114. 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
115. See id. at 64-80.
116. See Arie M. Rubenstein, Note, Verdicts of Conscience: Nullification and the Modem Jury Trial,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 959, 966 (2006).
117. See ABaL soN, supra note 7, at 36-37. It is important to note that the Sparf Court did not
explicitly bar nullification-it simply held that it was not error to instruct the jury that they must follow
the court's instruction on the law. See Sparf, 156 U.S. at 102-03. This is a fine point, and one that may
be without distinction, as courts interpreting Sparf discontinued instruction on the jury's right to
consider the law. Cf Caren Myers Morrison, Jury 2.0, 62 HAsTING L.J. 1579, 1595 (2011) (discussing
reasons for the lack of subsequent debate over a jury's right to decide the law).
118. See Sparf, 156 U.S. at 110 (Brewer, J., dissenting); id. at 113-14 (Gray, J., dissenting).
119. Cf id. at 112-14 (relating a discussion between a trial judge and juror about who could
interpret the legal elements of the crime charged).
120. See id. at 143.
121. 254 U.S. 135 (1920).
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what I say amounts to that."122 The Court concluded that "[i]n such a case
[where no facts were in dispute] obviously the function of the jury if they do
their duty is little more than formal."' 123 Justice Brandeis in his dissent warned
that "[w]hether a defendant is found guilty by a jury or is declared to be so by a
judge is not, under the federal Constitution, a mere formality."1 24 To treat it as
such would be to allow the trial judge to "usurp[] the province of the jury."
125
It would seem that Sparf and Homing sounded the death knell for jury
nullification, as well as for the historical notion of the independent juror as
champion of community values in the face of a powerful government. By
reducing the jury's verdict to a minimal and formalist function, the Court
appeared to banish Bushell, Zenger, and their brethren, and to eliminate any
opportunity for the common man to instill meaning in the law through his
verdict of conscience. As tragic and worthy as the story of the death of jury
nullification would be to recount, it is not nearly as compelling as what actually
happened. For all the certainty of the Sparf and, later, the Homing Courts,
nullification did not die. It lingered.
II. THE GHOST OF NULLIFICATION
Just as the path that led to Sparf was mottled, no level trajectory emanated
from it. On the one hand, Sparf has been and continues to be followed, but that
is hardly the whole story. Despite Sparfjs, and later, Homing's, clear prohibition
of jury nullification, it continues to exist. Indeed, nullification can never be
eliminated because the same Supreme Court that gave us Sparf and Homing
also embraces procedural protections such as double jeopardy, generalized
verdict forms, and an ambiguous standard of proof, which combine to give
shelter to nullification. Beyond this, it survives on some fundamental level
because defendants and jurors continue to make use of it. In the continued
requests for and acts of nullification, defendants and jurors cling to a role of the
jury that encompasses judgments about the law and definitions of culpability,
not mere adjudication of facts.
A. NULLIFICATION'S PERSISTENCE
The history of juries in America since 1895 is replete with stories of
suspected (and likely) nullification. 26 Some are heroic; some are troubling.
122. See id. at 140 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 138 (majority opinion).
124. Id. at 140 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
125. Id.
126. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANs ZEISEL, THE AME~acAN JuRY 115 (1966) (examining cases in
which the judge indicated he or she disagreed with the jury's verdict and estimating that approximately
twenty-nine percent of these disagreements were due, at least in part, to the jury's assessment of the
law). Famous examples of apparent jury nullification abound. Among those frequently cited are the
1996 acquittal of O.J. Simpson, the 1990 acquittal of Marion Barry on the most serious charges he
faced, the acquittal of Prohibition-era moonshiners, and the exoneration of Vietnam and Gulf War
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When a Catholic nun seeks acquittal for destruction of government property
after pouring her blood on a recruiting station to protest what she considers an
unjust war,127 she joins the company of abolitionists and racists, Prohibition-era
moonshiners and Vietnam protestors, anarchists and Marion Barry, and, most
recently, Guantanamo Bay detainees and other War-on-Terror suspects.'28 To be
sure, each of these defendants engaged in diverse actions with varying degrees
of violence and harm to the community. But all raised a defense that their
"criminal" acts were also political (and sometimes moral) ones necessitated by
overwhelming oppression and injustice and, more than this, by the lack of any
forum in which they could more effectively present their cause.
From these defendants' perspectives, their cause had been so thoroughly
suppressed by those in power that their only hope was to act outside the scope
of legal behavior and to engage in what they perceived as acts of civil
disobedience.2 9 Now charged with a crime because of their dissent, each relied
on the most primal of all defenses-that heir act, whether one of compassion,
justice, or rebellion, was justified and moral and therefore should not be
criminalized. Each claimed that the internal sense of justice or fairness that
motivated their actions should trump the laws of the state that would criminalize
those actions. Each relied on his ability to convince the jury that we, as a
community, are not trapped by a rigid construction of the law dictated by some
body so foreign to the community and its concepts of justice. These defendants
seek to appeal to the juror's most basic sense of fairness. Regardless of whether
the juror ultimately adopts the defendant's perspective, he or she will likely
arrive at a verdict out of the visceral reaction that the Sparf Court sought to
quiet.
It is no accident that this defense would find a place in the American justice
system. It draws on a long democratic tradition of citizen opposition to oppres-
sion. 130 It appeals to the American sense that we are, by our nature, a rebellious
protestors. Whether these verdicts are in fact a result of jury nullification is certainly up for debate, but
they are regularly cited as evidence of its continued existence. See CONRAD, supra note 99, at 167-86;
VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 106, at 224-25; Butler, supra note 16, at 681-84, 721 n.225 (discussing the
cases of O.J. Simpson and Marion Barry); Hodes, supra note 103, at 1088-90 (discussing examples of
jury nullification).
127. See Dan Higgins, Not Guilty Pleas for Blood-Throwing Protestors, ITHACA J., July 15, 2003, at
IB; Diana LaMattina, Protestors Stand by Actions, ITHACA J., Mar. 19, 2003, at 2A (discussing the
actions of four members of the Catholic Worker Movement who, in defense to charges of damaging
government property and trespass, attempted to argue that they did not believe their actions were
criminal but were designed to change what they considered to be an unjust state of the world-the war
in Iraq).
128. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
129. See MORTIMER R. KADISH & SANFORD H. KADISH, DIscRETION To DISOBEr. A STUDy OF LAWFUL
DEPARTURES FROM LEGAL RuLEs 4-5 (1973) (describing the willingness of citizens to engage in unlawful
actions when presented with laws or circumstances they consider contrary to their internal senses of
conscience as a last effort to force the law to align with their individual senses of order).
130. See ABRAMSON, supra note 7, at 88. As will be discussed further, in Part III, post-Sparf jurists
have returned to this concept of the jury time and again in considering the role the modern jury should
play.
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lot. We cling to and glorify our image as rebels with a cause; given the
opportunity to adhere to our consciences over an unjust law, we will claim that
opportunity and champion liberty and justice in the process. Such a vision of
America simultaneously summons both idyllic images of the triumph of moral-
ity and individualism over despotic rule and the tragedy of unchecked prejudice
and the narrow vision of an uncontrolled citizenry free to impose its will, and
law, from a jury box. For every Mr. Smith 31 there is someone beset with, in the
words of Atticus Finch, "cruel poverty and ignorance."132 In either circum-
stance, a system that allows nullification is not altogether without merit. It is
one in which jurors (not judges or legislators) write justice large even in a small
forum by defining the law in terms of the community's conscience. It is one in
which individuals stand together to promote an ideal that is bigger than them-
selves. It is one in which defendants are permitted to characterize their actions
not merely as single acts but as part of a continuum of social justice and change.
It is one in which the ordinary citizen can imbue meaning in the law. In this
America, the law is redefined. It ceases to be just a static, written body and
becomes a living one moved both in its application and communal acceptance
of that application. This view conceptualizes criminal law at its most basic level
as a codification of the community's sense of justice and morality in ways that
can adapt and shift as communal notions do. In this world, if the law ceases to
reflect the community's values, it loses its purpose and meaning.133
B. NULLIFICATION'S PROCEDURAL FOUNDATION
Regardless of the normative desirability of nullification, procedural protec-
tions that have long been at the core of our criminal-justice system allow
nullification to survive and even thrive. 134 The Double Jeopardy Clause, which
prevents acquitted defendants from being retried, also allows acquitting jurors
to avoid review.135 While this right was certainly designed to protect defen-
dants, it also serves to insulate verdicts of acquittal from review.'36 This leaves
131. See MR. SMITH GOES TO WASHINGTON (Columbia Pictures 1939).
132. HARPER LEE, To KIL A MocKiNGBLi 216 (1960). And yet, even Atticus put his faith in the
conscience of the everyman, telling Scout that "[t]he one thing that doesn't abide by majority rule is a
person's conscience." Id. at 114.
133. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576-79 (2003) (acknowledging that, as concepts of
acceptable personal behavior evolve, so too must the laws that regulate them).
134. See Rubenstein, supra note 116, at 985-87 (discussing the current failure to prevent nullifica-
tion and the difficulty of establishing procedural safeguards for nullification). The realization that the
risk of nullification is rare may make any procedural endorsement more palatable. Cf RANDOLPH N.
JONAKAIT, THE AmrRcAN Juav SYsTEm 258 (2003) (noting the rarity of jury nullification); Hannaford-
Agor & Hans, supra note 101, at 1252 (commenting that even considering hung juries as possible
evidence of nullification, the rate of nullification among American juries appears low).
135. See Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. 662, 669 (1896); Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 106
(1895); Butler, supra note 97.
136. See United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 128 (1980) ("The stated design, in terms of
specific purpose, has been expressed in various ways. It has been said that 'a' or 'the' 'primary purpose'
of the Clause was 'to preserve the finality of judgments' or the 'integrity' of judgments." (citations
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jurors free to render verdicts of acquittal as they see fit. 13 7 Given that judges
cannot direct verdicts of guilt from the bench, nor can they overturn a jury's
acquittal, a verdict of acquittal is, as a practical matter, untouchable.
1 38
Other procedures put in place to effectuate the goals of the Double Jeopardy
Clause offer additional protections for those who would nullify. Jurors cannot
be prosecuted for disobeying judicial instructions. A court cannot sua sponte
participate in jury deliberations, and it walks a fine line in inquiring into such
deliberations, even in the face of allegations of impropriety. 139 The nature of the
verdict form itself shelters jury deliberations from review and affords opportuni-
ties for nullification. Juries in criminal cases generally are not forced to return
special verdict forms that would allow courts to dissect their verdicts and
determine if they obediently confined themselves to the role of fact-finder.
140
Instead, jurors return general verdict forms that provide no information other
than the conclusion they reached. Only the jurors themselves can say with
certainty whether any particular verdict reflects conclusions of fact or conclu-
sions of law (assuming they are able to parse the two). Once a verdict is
rendered, a judge may poll each juror as to his or her verdict but may not
omitted) (quoting Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 33 (1978); United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 92
(1978))); see also Amar, supra note 91, at 1190 ("So too, the double jeopardy clause, which makes no
explicit mention of juries, should be understood to safeguard not simply the individual defendant's
interest in avoiding vexation, but also the integrity of the initial petit jury's judgment (much like the
Seventh Amendment's rule against 're-examin[ation]' of the civil jury's verdict)." (alteration in
original) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VII)).
137. See Yeager v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2360, 2368 (2009) ("A jury's verdict of acquittal
represents the community's collective judgment regarding all the evidence and arguments presented to
it. Even if the verdict is 'based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation,' its finality is unassailable."
(citation omitted) (quoting Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962) (per curiam)));
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 129 (stating that the "public interest in the finality of criminal judgments is so
strong that an acquitted defendant may not be retried even though 'the acquittal was based upon an
egregiously erroneous foundation' (quoting Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503 (1978))
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
138. See Sparf, 156 U.S. at 106 (affirming that verdicts of acquittal may not be set aside in criminal
cases); see also United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572-73 (1977) (noting that
judges may not direct verdicts of guilt); United Bhd. of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395,
408-10 (1947) (same); cf. United States v. Kerley, 838 F.2d 932, 937 (7th Cir. 1988) (arguing, per
Judge Posner, that, given the Court's tolerance of partial verdicts, it is not clear why judges cannot
direct complete verdicts of guilt).
139. See United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 612 (2d Cir. 1997) (describing a trial court's
decision to eject a juror after acquiring concrete evidence that the juror was seeking to nullify through
the jury's verdict).
140. See, e.g., United States v. Reed, 147 F.3d 1178, 1180 (9th Cir. 1998) (emphasizing a reluctance
to require special-verdict forms because of the intrusion on the jury's ability to serve its independent
function); United States v. Townsend, 924 F.2d 1385, 1413 (7th Cir. 1991) (also emphasizing a
reluctance to require special-verdict forms); United States v. Escobar-Garcia, 893 F.2d 124, 126 (6th
Cir. 1990) (same); United States v. Roman, 870 F.2d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 1989) (same); United States v.
Collamore, 868 F.2d 24, 28 (1st Cir. 1989) (same); United States v. Desmond, 670 F.2d 414, 416 (3d
Cir. 1982) (same); Watts v. United States, 362 A.2d 706, 714-15 (D.C. 1976) (en banc) (same); State v.
Hardison, 492 A.2d 1009, 1015-16 (N.J. 1985) (same); People v. Ribowsky, 568 N.E.2d 1197, 1201
(N.Y. 1991) (same).
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inquire into the basis for that verdict.141
Finally, the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard creates opportunities for
nullification--conscious or otherwise. Although courts have attempted to define
this standard through jury instructions,142 the standard by its very nature
remains vague. It allows jurors to return a verdict based on any doubt for which
they can give themselves and their fellow jurors a reason. While post-Sparf
courts may have intended such doubts to be only factual in nature, such a
distinction is problematic on several levels. First, it assumes a neat dichotomy
between matters that are factual and those that are legal, and that jurors can
understand this dichotomy when left to their own devices. As will be discussed
further, the Apprendi line questions the ability to compartmentalize such consid-
erations. Matters that are factual can also be legal and vice versa.143 Second, the
standard itself, which calls on jurors to convict without a reasonable doubt or to
acquit because of one, encourages jurors to vote with their hearts as well as their
minds. The standard challenges jurors to base verdicts of guilt on a certainty
that surpasses their personal doubts. In this, inevitably, the beyond-a-reasonable-
doubt standard calls on jurors to filter the evidence through their own con-
sciences in determining guilt. Reasonable doubt may be a doubt for which a
juror can give a reason, but courts do little to define the parameters of that
reason and never call on the juror to articulate it. In all this, the possibility of
nullification is preserved not only in the rules of procedure but in the very
standard by which culpability is judged.
In the end, while Sparf ordered juries to follow the law as instructed by
judges, other procedural protections and standards that remained in place,
ostensibly to protect the defendant, left courts with no way to monitor how well
the jury followed those instructions, if at all. Jurors have ample opportunity to
141. See United States v. Shepherd, 576 F.2d 719, 725 (7th Cir. 1978) ("The purpose of affording a
right to have the jury polled is not to invite each juror to reconsider his decision, but to permit an
inquiry as to whether the verdict is in truth unanimous.").
142. See, e.g., lA KEviN F. O'MALLEY, JAY E. GRENIG & WILLIAM C. LEE, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND
INSTRrlONS: CRMINAL § 12.10, at 161 (6th ed. 2008) (suggesting the following jury instruction
regarding the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt s andard: "It is not required that the government prove guilt
beyond all possible doubt. The test is one of reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is a doubt based
upon reason and common sense-the kind of doubt that would make a reasonable person hesitate to act.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt must, therefore, be proof of such a convincing character that a
reasonable person would not hesitate to rely and act upon it in the most important of his or her own
affairs.").
143. This idea about the false dichotomy between law and fact is hardly novel. The debate
surrounding the Court's efforts to draw neat boundaries around law (which it reserves for its own
judgment) and fact (which it allows for juror judgment) has percolated for some time in the academy:
The... explanation for the chaotic legal landscape is that much of the effort to properly
delineate matters as questions of law or fact is animated by the belief that the two terms, "law"
and "fact," specify different kinds of entities, that there is a qualitative or ontological
distinction between them. This belief is false.
Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, Essay, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 Nw. U. L. REV.
1769, 1770 (2003); see also Ray A. Brown, Fact and Law in Judicial Review, 56 HARv. L. REv. 899,
900 (1943) (discussing the false division between questions of law and those of fact).
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disregard these instructions or to interpret them in a manner permitting nullifica-
tion with no consequences. In some cases, jurors likely do just that.
Ill. THE JURY's SECOND COMING
The Court has not explicitly revisited the issue of jury nullification since
Sparf and Homing. The Court has, however, left in place the procedural
protections that have allowed nullification to survive. Moreover, it has engaged
in an almost constant conversation about the role of the jury in a constitutional
democracy.144 As the notion of the modem jury evolved, spurred largely by
Warren Court decisions, it has moved from the marginalized place suggested by
cases like Sparf to a central one-not only from the perspective of preserving
the rights of a defendant but also as a source of legitimacy for the law. As the
Apprendi case line pushes the role of the jury further toward assessing true
culpability, it opens the possibility of returning the jury to its historical role of
judging not only the facts of a case but also the meaning of the law as applied to
a particular defendant.
A. THE WARREN COURT'S REVITALIZATION OF THE JURY
By 1968, the Court was at a crossroads with regard to the right to a jury trial.
In Duncan v. Louisiana,145 the Court held that the jury-trial right applied to
states via the Fourteenth Amendment. 146 Duncan overturned over thirty years of
precedent that held that "trial by jury may be abolished" if states chose to do
SO. 147 The Court grounded its decision in an expanded notion of the role of the
jury as "fundamental to the American scheme of justice."148 The right to a jury
trial was cemented "among those 'fundamental principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions"' and therefore was
incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment. 149 The Court's analysis hinged on
the function and goals of the right to a jury trial.1 50 Echoing the writings of the
Founders and other jurists, the Court defined the prime purpose of the right to a
jury trial as "to prevent oppression by the [g]overnment ... [and flear of
unchecked power."15' In the context of criminal cases, such protections were
144. See generally Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 18, for an excellent and concise study of the
evolution of the jury in American jurisprudence.
145. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
146. See id. at 155-56.
147. E.g., Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
148. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149.
149. Id. at 148 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
150. See id. at 148-49.
151. Id. at 155-56. This characterization was consistent with some lower courts' analysis. In 1942,
Judge Learned Hand described the role of the jury as introducing "a slack into the enforcement of law,
tempering its rigor by the mollifying influence of current ethical conventions." United States ex rel.
McCann v. Adams, 126 F2d 774, 775-76 (2d Cir. 1942). The Court in Duncan acknowledged that the
literal and figurative wisdom of permitting juries to consider complex legal matters had long been a
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rooted in an "insistence upon community participation in the determination of
guilt or innocence."'152 In short, the right to a jury was not only protected by the
Constitution; it was also essential to the democracy and the law itself. Given
this central role, it could not be set aside by the states.153 The role of the jury
was recast from Sparfis formalistic fact-finder to a pivotal political actor
charged with balancing the community's values against the written law in the
hopes of preventing governmental oppression.
Duncan did more than restore the right to jury trial within the states. It
represented a fundamental shift in the Court's thinking about the role of the
jury-from the purely formalistic one of determining facts within the judicially
ordained context of the law, to one steeped in democratic tradition and requiring
a functional analysis.154 This conclusion implicitly acknowledged that jury
nullification, for all its controversy, was integral to the jury as a political actor.
Duncan's focus on the role of a jury as a means to "prevent oppression by the
[g]ovemment" and to allow "community participation in the determination of
guilt or innocence"'155 would by necessity encompass a jury that contemplated
the meaning of the law as applied to the defendant and the citizens' lives-a
jury that could nullify, or redefine, a law that ceased to represent and promote
communal values.
The same year as Duncan, the Court considered the construction of a
death-eligible jury in Witherspoon v. Illinois.'56 Again the Court endorsed a
vibrant role for the jury beyond the formalistic one suggested in Sparf. "[One
of the most important functions any jury can perform... is to maintain a link
between contemporary community values and the penal system .... ,157 With-
out the ability to interpret, and in the process define, the law, it is not clear how
the jury could serve the function assigned it by the Duncan and Witherspoon
Courts. These decisions not only endorse the historical role of the jury but also
recognize the benefits of a jury that serves as a bridge between the written law
and the community the law affects.
Duncan's and Witherspoon's construction of the jury as a political actor was
reiterated in Taylor v. Louisiana.158 In Taylor, the Court held that while the
Sixth Amendment's guarantee of an impartial jury did not include a right to
have a jury composed of a particular group, it did prohibit the states from
systematically excluding certain cognizable groups from juror eligibility.' 59
subject of debate but concluded that when jurors arrived at different conclusions than judges, they
fulfilled the purposes for which they were created-to check the government's power and to ground the
law in the community's values. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156-57.
152. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156.
153. See id.
154. See Rubenstein, supra note 116, at 977.
155. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 155-56.
156. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
157. Id. at 519 n.15.
158. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
159. See id. at 538.
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Again the Court grounded its decision on the premise that he role of the jury
was "to guard against the exercise of arbitrary power-to make available the
commonsense judgment of the community as a hedge against the overzealous or
mistaken prosecutor and in preference to the professional or perhaps overcondi-
tioned or biased response of a judge."' 6 The Taylor Court recognized the power
of the jury as a means to check not only the legislative branch but also the
executive and judicial branches. It called on the citizen to use the judgment that
had informed the common law-that common sense of justice springing from
citizens giving meaning to the law through application and community endorse-
ment. In this vision, community values and the everyman's perspective are more
than an archaic holdover from common-law days. They are the basis of the law
itself and a crucial safeguard should government lose track of the values of the
citizenry it governs.
These decisions are part of a line emanating from a Court that sought to
define the constitutional significance and function of the jury; in so doing, it
implicitly overturned the formalistic reduction of the jury suggested in Sparf
and Homing. 161 These cases define jurors not only as finders of facts but also as
devices that prevent government oppression through their ability to bridge the
chasm between the written law and the lives of the governed. Under this
paradigm, jurors draw their power not from their ability to parse facts but from
their ability to represent the community and to define criminal acts in terms of
the community's perception of them. Necessarily included in this role of the
juror is the role of the nullifier.
B. APPRENDI V NEW JERSEY AND ITS PROGENY
This view of jurors as occupying a wider space than that of fact-finders is
obvious in the Court's most recent cases on the role of juries. In Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 162 the Court struck down New Jersey's sentencing enhancement for
160. Id. at 530 (citing Duncan, 391 U.S. at 155-56).
161. See Rubenstein, supra note 116, at 978-82; see also Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 480-83
(1990) (holding that juries need only represent a cross section of the community so far as such a
representation "best furthers the [Sixth] Amendment's central purpose"); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S.
404, 410 (1972) (plurality opinion) (holding that unanimity is not required because "the purpose of trial
by jury is to prevent oppression by the Government"); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970)
(holding that the size of modem juries did not have to be faithful to common law, so long as their
numbers were sufficient to "prevent oppression by the Government").
162. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Apprendi itself was a continuation of the Court's acknowledgment, begun
the year before in Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999), of the jury's critical role in assessing
culpability. In Jones, the Court avoided the ultimate question litigated in Apprendi but nonetheless
spoke of the jury in historical terms. See 526 U.S. at 251-52.
In addition to the Apprendi line, the Court has continued its revitalization of the jury through its
recent decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). In Crawford, the Court overturned a
longstanding hearsay exception as inconsistent with the Confrontation Clause, emphasizing the impor-
tance of the jury's role in reviewing and receiving evidence at trial. See id. at 62, 68-69. Justice Scalia
noted that the jury system is premised on a belief that "judges, like other government officers, could not
always be trusted to safeguard the rights of the people" and therefore communal review through a jury
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racially motivated crimes because it was based on findings made by a judge, not
a jury, using less than a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard.
163
The State attempted to move consideration of racial motivation outside the
jury's prerogative by characterizing it as a sentencing factor and not as an
element of the offense. But the Court saw through the State's euphemisms for
facts that support a finding of culpability. 64 Justice Stevens, writing for the
majority, explained that "the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of
effect."165 Where a factual determination has the effect of increasing the
sentence beyond the statutory maximum otherwise available, it must be submit-
ted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 166 Such a ruling rejects the
state's mechanization of criminal sanction, instead requiring findings of culpabil-
ity that support a sentence to be made by a jury using a beyond-a-reasonable-
doubt standard. Justice Stevens concluded, "Other than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reason-
able doubt."'167 In this analysis, the Court vested determination of what is
criminal, and so sanctionable, in the jury.
While Apprendi may have spoken only of a determination of facts, the
holding is consistent with Duncan, Witherspoon, and Taylor-the function of
the jury cannot be obscured or overridden by state procedural end runs; the
jury's role is too vital. In the terms of nullification, New Jersey can increase
Apprendi's sentence based on his racial animus only if members of the defen-
dant's community find both that he did in fact harbor such a state of mind and
also that it rose to a criminal, and so sanctionable, level. Without such a
determination, a sentencing enhancement is arbitrary and illegitimate. The
Court thus reclaimed for the jury the power to define not only the presence or
absence of a fact but also the significance of that fact to a defendant's sentence.
The Court acknowledged that it was casting the role of the jury in political
terms-to "guard against a spirit of oppression and tyranny on the part of rulers
[and to function] as the great bulwark of [our] civil and political liberties."
168
The cases that followed Apprendi reiterated this approach to the role of the
was necessary. Id. at 67. In an earlier case, when contemplating the significance of juror review of
evidence, Justice Scalia referred to the jury as "the spinal column of American democracy." Neder v.
United States, 527 U.S. 1, 30 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He further
noted that the Founders' view of the jury as a vital community-based check on formal government was
grounded in no small part on their "healthy suspicion of the power of government." Id. at 32.
163. See 530 U.S. at 476 (holding that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require that all facts that
increase a defendant's sentence be proven to a jury using a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard).
164. See id. at 493-94.
165. Id. at 494.
166. See id. at 490. By creating an exception for cases where the sentence-enhancing fact is the mere
existence of a prior conviction, Apprendi avoided overruling Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523
U.S. 224 (1998). See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 487-90 & n.14.
167. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.




jury. Most notably, in 2004, Blakely v. Washington 169 struck down Washington
State's sentencing scheme. In Blakely, the Court returned to the concept of a
jury serving a larger role than mere finders of fact. The Court again charged the
jury with serving as the bridge between the written law and the community the
law affected. The Court noted that the right to trial by jury "is no mere
procedural formality, but a fundamental reservation of power in our constitu-
tional structure. Just as suffrage ensures the people's ultimate control in the
legislative and executive branches, jury trial is meant to ensure [the people's]
control in the judiciary."170 Central to that function, the Court concluded, is the
jury's role as "circuitbreaker in the State's machinery of justice." '71 For a jury
to truly serve this purpose, it must be a body independent from the government
and independent in its ability to judge both law and fact.'
72
The Court came to similar conclusions in its examination of the federal
sentencing guidelines in United States v. Booker.17 3 In Booker, the Court again
sought to preserve the substance of the Sixth Amendment's promise of a right to
trial by jury; it supported the jury's role as protecting against government
oppression by injecting communal values and perspective into the law.174 In
Booker, the Court endorsed this concept of the jury's role even at the cost of the
consistency in sentencing afforded by the sentencing guidelines.175 This notion
of consistency, which had been the currency of the Sparf and Homing Courts,
was still important in Booker. The opinion stressed consistent application of the
law and rescued the guidelines (in part) by making them advisory.I76 But the
goal of consistency was tempered by the potentially competing goal of allowing
citizens to define the meaning of the law through active participation in the
determination of the law's application to the defendant before them. Matters of
169. See generally 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (finding that a departure from the statutory sentencing range
implicated the Sixth Amendment).
170. Id. at 305-06.
171. Id. at 306.
172. See id. Or, as the Court noted, it must not be "relegated to making a determination that the
defendant at some point did something wrong, a mere preliminary to a judicial inquisition into the facts
of the crime the State actually seeks to punish." Id. at 307.
173. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
174. In Booker, the Court noted that it was "not motivated by Sixth Amendment formalism, but by
the need to preserve Sixth Amendment substance." Id. at 237.
175. See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 18, at 915-16 (discussing the conflict between goals of
uniformity and larger concepts of justice). In Apprendi, Justice Scalia noted that while the goal of
efficiency in the judiciary is admirable, the value of the jury, which he described as "never...
efficient," was more important to the Founders. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 498-99 (2000)
(Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Stevens separately noted in Booker,
We recognize, as we did in Jones, Apprendi, and Blakely, that in some cases jury factfinding
may impair the most expedient and efficient sentencing of defendants. But the interest in
fairness and reliability protected by the right to a jury trial-a common-law right that
defendants enjoyed for centuries and that is now enshrined in the Sixth Amendment-has
always outweighed the interest in concluding trials swiftly.
Booker, 543 U.S. at 243-44.
176. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 259.
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culpability and sanction required more than an automated determination.'77
They required a communal finding in the form of a jury's verdict to construct
meaning and so the law. At the end of the day, the right to a jury trial was more
than the right to twelve warm bodies with no choice but to endorse the judge's
predetermination of the meaning of the law. Rather, Booker insisted "that the
jury would still stand between the individual and the power of the government
under the new sentencing regime.'
178
C. WHAT APPRENDI MEANS FOR JURY NULLIFICATION
Admittedly, Apprendi and its progeny are cases about which facts a jury must
consider. These cases never mention explicitly a right to nullify or even broach
the topic of jurors deciding law. Some, therefore, may question whether these
cases are relevant to the question of nullification. Read correctly, however,
Apprendi is about more than merely drawing a line around the facts that are the
province of the jury.
At its core, Apprendi is about creating legitimacy in the law through the
vehicle contemplated by the Constitution-the jury. The Apprendi line rejects
the mechanization of sanction and strips notions of culpability to their essence
by requiring a finding by a jury that an individual has engaged in an act that is
"criminal," and so can be subjected to state punishment. Without this jury
determination, the state's sanction is drawn wholly from the prosecutor's charge
and the judiciary's endorsement of that charge through its construction and
judgment of the written law. As such, it may mean little to the community that
stands as witness to this sanction because that community had little to no part in
either the formulation of the sanction or its application to the defendant.
Without the opportunity for juror participation in the assessment of culpability,
the gulf between the written law and the citizens to whom that law would apply
grows wider, until the community may no longer recognize its own values in the
text of the law.
In the face of this alienation, the logical and historical roots of Apprendi push
for a more fluid reconceptionalization of the law and sanctions consistent with
the Founders' vision. Indeed, Apprendi wholeheartedly endorses the idea that
the jury is to serve as a "guard against a spirit of oppression and tyranny on the
part of rulers [and to function] as the great bulwark of [our] civil and political
liberties."179 If jurors are merely to rubber-stamp the law as declared by the
judge in his or her instructions, how can they be a bulwark against legal dictates
that, either in general or as applied to a particular defendant, are oppressive or
tyrannical?
Furthermore, Apprendi's logic in rejecting the distinction between sentencing
177. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
178. Booker, 543 U.S. at 237.




factors (which could be decided by the court) and elements (which must be
decided by the jury) applies with equal force to the distinction between law and
fact. Apprendi made clear that "the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of
effect." 80 If issues that were labeled as mere sentencing factors led to more
severe punishment, they too must be decided by the jury regardless of their
label. The distinction between law and fact must fail as well. Legal issues, no
less than factual issues, impact a defendant's ultimate punishment. Given this
"effect," those legal issues are rightfully the province of the jury.
Read this way, Apprendi emerges as part of a line (albeit a bumpy one at
times) that vests the legitimacy of the law, and indeed the very concept of the
law, in the power of ordinary citizens to apply that law to the accused and find
some meaning in the process. While the specifics of the sentence itself may or
may not be contemplated by a jury, jurors know that a criminal conviction
results in a sentence and often a deprivation of liberty.181 The opportunity for
juror consideration of the basis of a sentence lends it the weight required to
mean something more than just time served. The sentence takes on a communal
significance because its justification is born out of a community judgment that it
is deserved, it is appropriate, and it is sufficient.
In the context of nullification, the Apprendi line restores the role of the jury
as the bridge between what the law would seek to criminalize (and therefore
punish) and what we as a society will accept from the law in our own lives.
These cases should not be read as a mere recognition of the superiority of
twelve common people to ascertain facts but of the power of those facts when
weighed by people charged with determining whether the existence of those
facts warrants sanction. It is an endorsement of the role of the jury as a means of
preserving democracy and imbuing the law with meaning.
The concept of nullification is born of the same ideal. It offers the opportu-
nity for everyday citizens to weigh in on whether they believe something should
be criminal and so to define the law itself. Apprendi endorses Justice Brandeis's
warning in Homing that the right to a jury is not some formalistic vestige
embedded in the Constitution.1 82 The Apprendi line recognizes that the right to
a jury is simultaneously the right of the defendant to have his or her community
judge the significance of his or her acts, and the right of the community to judge
the culpability of a defendant without governmental (be it judicial, executive, or
legislative) restriction. Apprendi is part of the Court's continued move toward
the historical vision of the jury as a necessary component o the creation of law.
180. Id. at 494.
181. Cf. United States v. Polizzi, 549 F. Supp. 2d 308, 406-08 (E.D.N.Y 2008) (describing the
history of juries declining to convict defendants of higher offenses, which carried capital sentences,
despite factual evidence to support such convictions), vacated, 564 F.3d 142 (2d Cir. 2009). Jurors in
colonial America also frequently found defendants "guilty but penniless," thereby avoiding rendering
the defendant's family paupers by circumventing mandatory forfeiture of property to the crown. See id.
at 412.
182. See Homing v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135, 140 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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The jury thus legitimates the law through its interpretation and application.
Apprendi recognizes that this legitimation cannot occur via some mechanized
approach to sanction or without communal review of the basis of punishment.
As much as the Apprendi line has been decried as a radical new vision of the
jury, at its heart it is little more than a return to the constitutional tradition,
assimilated from common law, that the jury is more than a rubber stamp or a
judge of facts. While the Court's decision in Sparf may be read as a loss of faith
in the ability and validity of the jury, Apprendi renews that faith. The Apprendi
line ushers in a second coming of the jury as a bridge between the citizenry and
the written body of the law. While Apprendi does not explicitly overturn
Sparf-the post-Apprendi Court to date has only discussed the extension of the
jury's power to weigh questions of fact that form the basis for sentencing-its
theoretical underpinnings suggest that it is time for a reconsideration of Spar. It
is time to return to the historical tradition of the American jury.
IV. RECASTING JURY NULLIFICATION
As Apprendi pushes the jury into a more active role in determining the basis
of a defendant's culpability and, more broadly, in defining the law, the prospect
of nullification looms large. This raises a fundamental question: Is the possibil-
ity of jury nullification, or law defined by jurors, a good thing? Jury nullification
is itself a loaded term that raises concerns in the same way any possibility of
rebellion threatens the status quo. I am not attempting to answer all the possible
concerns surrounding a system that openly allows jury nullification, but some
primary concerns warrant preliminary discussion.
First, would jury nullification undermine the rule of law? This fear appears
overstated. Jury nullification embodies ideas of functionalism and popular
constitutionalism that are consistent with the rule of law in a constitutional
democracy. Second, does a jury offer a true forum for community values, or
does the nature of jury selection and eligibility preclude large portions of the
population from participating in this method of constructing law? If there is
such exclusion, does nullification ultimately further, rather than prevent, oppres-
sive rule?183 This concern raises serious questions about the role of juries
themselves, as well as about the effect and desirability of nullification. The
presence of this concern, however, supports modification of jury-selection
processes, not the continued exclusion of nullification. Finally, the possibility of
nullification raises fundamental questions about what sort of process can and
should be adopted to accommodate the revival of the jury's role in defining law.
While inclusion of nullification in jury instructions and casting nullification as a
defense-affirmative or otherwise-is a starting place in the procedural discus-
sion, wider discussion inevitably must follow. That procedural conversation and
183. The Court has recognized that the exclusion of certain groups from jury selection or eligibility




adjustment will have to occur, however, does not counsel towards the continued
exclusion of nullification.
A. JURY NULLIFICATION AND THE RULE OF LAW
The ability of the citizenry to judge not only the facts of the case, but also the
very notion that the defendant's conduct should be criminalized, lends legiti-
macy to the law and allows the criminal process to expand to encompass
situations not previously considered. Inevitably, this expansion will push against
the boundaries previously demarcated by the written law and may seem antitheti-
cal to notions of the rule of law. This, then, raises the question of the value of
the rule of law itself, at least one constructed in static terms around a written
and inflexible text, in the face of a moral, social, or political crisis.
There clearly are benefits to the rule of law as a means of preventing arbitrary
exercise of authority and ensuring predictability.184 The rule of law instills order
in society and in turn "ensure[s] individual liberty" and prevents government
oppression.185 It is, by its nature, positivist.186 It is the result of identified and
codified sources of prohibition and sanction found in statutes, constitutions, and
case law created and enforced by designated actors.187 If a citizen wants notice
that a behavior is prohibited, he or she need only search out the statute that
forbids it.188 This formalistic construction of the rule of law envisions a body of
legal text that may be the product of community input but, once constructed, is
static in its existence and application. As a result, this vision of the law is
divorced from concepts of morality and social realities. 189 On the one hand, this
static or consistent application by known, designated actors is a source of its
strength. On the other hand, it risks a mechanization in application that renders
it unrecognizable to its citizenry, and so runs the risk that it will not resonate
with the citizenry and will not be obeyed.
Alternatively, one can reconstruct the theory of the rule of law around notions
of functionalism, as opposed to formalism.190 In this construction, the rule of
184. See Darryl K. Brown, Jury Nullification Within the Rule of Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1149,
1156-58 (1997).
185. Id. at 1156; see ANDREW ALTMAN, CarcAL LEGAL STUDIEs: A LIBERAL CRITIQUE 12-13 (1990);
JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 206-13 (rev. ed. 1999); Judith N. Shklar, Political Theory and the
Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW: IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY 1, 1-2 (Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick Monahan
eds., 1987).
186. See Brown, supra note 184, at 1159.
187. See id.
188. See Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Unenumerated Constitutional Rights and the Rule of Law, 14
HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 615, 615-16 (1991) (discussing the benefits afforded by popular knowledge of
concepts of legality and justice).
189. See Brown, supra note 184, at 1159 ("[T]he rule of law is separate from questions of
morality ... "); Jules L. Coleman, Rules and Social Facts, 14 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 703, 715 (1991)
("[M]orality of a legal norm is analytically distinct from its legality.").
190. See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LrrERATURE 163 (3d ed. 2009) ("No civilized society has ever
embraced the legalist position in undiluted form.... [Liaw is the art of governance by rules, rather
than an automated machinery of enforcement."); Barnett, supra note 188, at 615-16, 620 (contending
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law expands to encompass competing visions and legal interpretations. The
definition of what is law is shifted from the static text alone to the enforcement
and endorsement of that text within the community.'91 This reconceptualization
of the rule of law strikes a compromise between what one might call the "rule of
text," which can be static and overly rigid, and the "rule of man" (at the other
end of the theoretical spectrum), which can be too unstable and left to every
individual to decide. This happy medium recognizes that the law must and will
be interpreted in order to achieve larger goals of justice and equity.192 Some-
times this process of interpretation will confound the text of the law, requiring
its modification or even abandonment.193 But without such a process, the law
will lack genuine meaning.
A conception of the law as a fluid body that is forever reliant on community
acceptance and application, even if only in individual cases, creates a risk that
the law's authority will become fickle and unrecognizable, with only those
that the rule of law is satisfied not only through written laws but also through any method that enables
individuals to understand the law in advance); Brown, supra note 184, at 1164-70 (arguing that jury
nullification can be reconciled with notions of the rule of law if the rule of law is viewed as
encompassing both social values and codified statutes); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83
CALIF. L. Rev. 953, 959-68 (1995) (arguing that law is drawn from many sources); Rubenstein, supra
note 116, at 959-60 (arguing that the rule of law ought to be modified to value functionalism over
formalism).
191. This fluid conceptualization of law and the rule of law is already present in criminal statutes
that rely on communal assessment of motivation to support a finding of criminality. Pornography and
theft-of-honest-services statutes are two examples of criminal statutes that hinge on community
perceptions about the activity in question to support a finding of criminality. See supra note 98.
192. Darryl Brown has argued that many forms of nullification are consistent with the rule of law
and fall squarely within the originally contemplated powers of the jury. See Brown, supra note 184, at
1172, 1178-79, 1183. He identifies four distinct types of nullification. The first type is one in which a
jury acquits a defendant because the jury believes the government has engaged in misconduct so that,
even though the jury finds the law and its application just, they penalize the government by returning a
not-guilty verdict. See id. at 1172 (noting, as an example, the 1995 acquittal of O.J. Simpson on murder
charges in which the jury may have voted to acquit, despite factual evidence of guilt, out of a sense that
the Los Angeles Police Department and the District Attorney's office had acted improperly). The
second is one in which a jury acquits a defendant for violating what the jury believes is an unjust law.
See id. at 1178-79 (noting as an example "the refusal of northern juries before the Civil War to convict
defendants under the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850"). The third is one in which a jury acquits a defendant
because the jury believes the law has been unjustly applied. See id. at 1183 (noting as an example of
this type of nullification jurors' refusal to convict a defendant for a relatively minor offense that
nonetheless qualifies as a "third strike" under recidivist-offender statutes); see also id. at 1185
(classifying Paul Butler's proposed racially based nullification-in which juries are encouraged to
nullify drug convictions based on race-under the third category). The final form of nullification is one
in which a jury acquits a defendant because of the jury's bias or prejudice. See id. at 1191-92 (noting as
an example of this type of nullification "acquittals by all-white, southern juries of white defendants who
killed, assaulted, or harassed civil rights activists or African Americans generally"). Brown argues that
only this final form of nullification is without principle and inconsistent with the original vision of the
jury and the rule of law. See id. at 1195-96.
193. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the "Judicial
Power" in Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 996-97 (2001) (contending
that early methods of judicial statutory interpretation went beyond mere consideration of the plain text);
John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARv. L. REv. 2387, 2388-93 (2003) (recognizing but
criticizing the canon that statutes may be interpreted to avoid absurd results).
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fortunate enough to serve on nullifying juries given the power to define it.
Admittedly, there is a risk that jurors may apply the law arbitrarily in some
cases. But this risk appears no more threatening than the risk that a renegade
legislative, executive, or judicial branch will unfairly create or apply the law.'94
This latter risk presumably goes without notice or great alarm because of the
checks and balances that exist among the three traditional branches of govern-
ment, which are designed in large part to check such abuses. The process of
juror nullification has its own checks and balances as well. First, its scope is
limited. An act of juror nullification affects a single verdict. Second, it requires
the consensus of individual jurors, which in situations foreign to community
values may be difficult to achieve. Finally, even in the face of juror nullification,
alternative judicial and legislative possibilities exist if the verdict offends
community values. State prosecutions that fall victim to jury nullification may
be retried in state court, in the case of a hung jury, and in federal court, in the
case of a state acquittal, without offending the Double Jeopardy Clause.'
95
Alternatively, citizens, appalled by acts of nullification, may seek to redefine the
law through more formalized processes-such as by rallying for legislative or
social change.196 In each of these, there is an opportunity for a true back and
forth between competing communal views to arrive at some conclusion regard-
ing what the law is and ought to be. To banish juror nullification, on the other
hand, is to curtail this back-and-forth process, and so to stagnate the law in the
name of consistency. As discussed in Part II, efforts to ban nullification have not
194. Cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) ("If men were
angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal
[controls] on government would be necessary.").
195. A recent example was the decision to charge the police officers involved in the highly
publicized beating of Rodney King with federal civil-rights violations after they were acquitted of
criminal charges in state court in what many viewed as an act of juror nullification. See Laurie L.
Levenson, The Future of State and Federal Civil Rights Prosecutions: The Lessons of the Rodney King
Trial, 41 UCLA L. REv. 509, 510-11 (1994).
196. For example, legislative change enacted during the Civil Rights Movement of the twentieth
century was, at least in part, a response to racially based jury nullification:
The Civil Rights Movement, for example, was fueled in large part by the consistent acquittals
(by all white juries) in state criminal courts in the American South in the early 1960s. In
examples ranging from rape to assault to murder, juries seemed reluctant to apply the law to
defendants they knew to be guilty-as an effort, it seems, to maintain a particular social order
and resist the unwanted federal presence and intervention by outsiders.
2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AmmcRAN Civu LIBERTIES 869-70 (Paul Finkelman ed., 2006). Chief Judge Bazelon
made a similar argument:
One often-cited abuse of the nullification power is the acquittal by bigoted juries of whites
who commit crimes (lynching, for example) against blacks. That repellent practice cannot be
directly arrested without jeopardizing important constitutional protections-the double jeop-
ardy bar and the jury's power of nullification. But the revulsion and sense of shame fostered
by that practice fueled the civil rights movement, which in turn made possible the enactment
of major civil rights legislation.
United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1143 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (footnote omitted).
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succeeded. 197 Instead, such efforts have merely removed the practice from the
process of review that could make it more transparent and accountable.
Indeed, the post-Sparf examples of nullification 98 demonstrate that even
when commanded to adhere to jury instructions on the law,199 jurors will not
necessarily listen or understand. If Sparfs goal of consistent and erudite applica-
tion of the law is worth preserving, this continued willingness of jurors to resist
judicial instruction raises serious questions. While it is doubtful that the criminal-
justice system will descend into anarchy under the weight of haphazard ver-
dicts, the loss of predictable and evenhanded sanctions (even if only in a
smattering of cases) is still significant in a system that strives toward order and
equality.2°° This said, it is hard to imagine a system that would eradicate
197. See supra notes 126-33 and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
199. Jury instructions post-Sparfdo reflect an effort to inform jurors that they are to judge only facts.
See, e.g., JUDGE D. BROCK HoRNBY's 2012 REVIsIONS TO PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCIONS FOR THE
DisTRICr CouRrs OF THE FIRST CiRcUrr 11 (2012), http://www.med.uscourts.gov/practices/crpjilinks.pdf
("It will be your duty to decide from the evidence what the facts are. You [the jury], and you alone, are
the judges of the facts. You will hear the evidence, decide what the facts are, and then apply those facts
to the law I [the judge] give to you. That is how you will reach your verdict. In doing so you must
follow that law whether you agree with it or not."). Although the text of some state constitutions gives
juries the power to review the law, judicial decisions in those states have all but eliminated the right.
See Samuel T. Morison, Custom, Reason, and the Common Law: A Reply to Hasnas, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIERTY 209, 239 (2007) (noting that while the Maryland, Indiana, and Georgia state constitutions allow
juror consideration of both the law and facts, such provisions have been eviscerated by judicial
interpretation); see also Carman v. State, 396 N.E.2d 344, 346 (Ind. 1979) ("Although our Constitution
grants to juries the right to determine the law, it is to do so under the guidance of the trial judge, and in
so doing, it may not disregard the law."); Sparks v. State, 603 A.2d 1258, 1277 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1992) ("[C]ase law has made it clear that that curious constitutional relic has, through the interpretative
process, been shrivelled up to almost nothing.").
200. The goals of uniformity and proportionality achieved through uniform application of the law
are present throughout the criminal-justice system. For example, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
articulate three goals: honesty, uniformity, and proportionality in sentencing. See U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N, 2011 FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 2 (2011), http://www.ussc.gov/guidelinesl
2011_Guidelines/ManualPDF/Chapter1.pdf. District Judge Marvin Frankel, one of the architects of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, criticized the previous discretion afforded judges in sentencing as
"terrifying and intolerable for a society that professes devotion to the rule of law." MARVIN E. FRANKEL,
CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WrrHOUT ORDER 5 (1973). While rendering the guidelines merely advisory,
the Court in Booker emphasized that it was not abandoning the laudable goal of uniform sentencing.
See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 250, 253-54 (2005).
In another context, while prosecutors enjoy relatively unfettered discretion in charging decisions,
such discretion does not survive constitutional scrutiny upon a demonstration of selectivity in enforce-
ment. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463-71 (1996) (discussing equal-protection
challenges to prosecutorial discretion); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-10 (1985) (same).
The other check on prosecutorial discretion requires charging decisions to be proportional to the
defendant's culpability and not be based on vindictiveness. See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 25-29
(1974) (acknowledging that while there is a presumption of no vindictiveness in charging decisions,
this presumption is rebutted upon a showing of an improper motive for the charge).
While there is certainly value in each of these contexts to uniform and consistent application of the
law, both sentencing and prosecutorial discretion have been problematic when they appear to disregard
individualized consideration of the defendant. See Bums v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220 (1932)
(holding that notions of fairness in sentencing can only be realized when judges engage in "individual-
ize[d,] ... careful, humane, and comprehensive consideration to the particular situation of each of-
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nullification completely and still comport with basic constitutional protec-
tions.20 1 Likely the Sparf Court recognized this fact. Despite the impotence it
might have felt in relying on ineffectual instructions to achieve its end, the risk
of tearing down constitutionally embedded procedural protections was more
daunting. On some fundamental level, the constitutional core of criminal proce-
dure, as well as later decisions about the role of juries, confirms the value of
nullification within the system.
In many ways, the existence of the jury itself creates a Catch-22 for post-
Sparf courts. The very characteristic that makes folks good jurors (that they are
ordinary citizens) is the same source of fears over their capability in judging
(and defining) the law-that as ordinary citizens they are unable to fully
understand the meanings of the law in all its complexities and so they render
verdicts that are inconsistent and ignorant.20 2 Put another way, they base their
verdicts on emotion and not reason.20 3 The theory goes that such verdicts do
harm to the community and violence to the law itself.
Robert Cover famously wrote of the law as a system in constant tension,
"linking a concept of a reality to an imagined alternative.., both of which can
be represented in their normative significance only through the device[] of [the]
narrative .,,2 4 Cover reasoned that it was only through the process of incorporat-
ing people's stories and experiences that the law becomes grounded and work-
able.205 Cover acknowledged that the resulting legal meaning will be replete
with conflicting and competing narratives, but it was error to assume that the
law must choose one to survive.2° Quite the contrary, Cover urged that, in
order to develop a meaningful and consistent body of laws, such divergent
narratives should be embraced with a "well-honed sense of where the rule
would end and why.",
20 7
To Cover's modern vision of the rule of law, there is an inevitable conflict
between the desire to have an expanding notion of the law and a desire to
enforce order on the populace.208 Like Ronald Dworkin, Cover believed that in
fender"); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949) (reiterating the dislike for rigid sentencing
rules that did not encompass "modem concepts individualizing punishment"). In later cases, the Court
seemed to support a balance between goals of uniformity and fairness. See Kimbrough v. United States,
552 U.S. 85, 90-91 (2007) (allowing judges post-Booker to consider disparities in sentencing that result
from individual circumstances and efforts to apply the now-advisory guidelines). These cases speak to
the same tension found in the nullification debate: uniformity, while a valuable tool in preventing
discrimination or inequality, is a double-edged sword when it comes to defining culpability and justice.
201. See supra notes 134-43 and accompanying text.
202. Cf. ABRAMSON, supra note 7, at 45-55 (discussing the tension between the goal of an impartial
jury and the current means of achieving that goal-selecting an ignorant jury).
203. See United States v. Polizzi, 549 F. Supp. 2d 308, 407-11 (E.D.N.Y 2008) (describing appeals
to jurors' empathy in order to produce more just verdicts), vacated, 564 F3d 142 (2d Cir. 2009).
204. Cover, supra note 3, at 9.
205. See id. at 4-5.
206. See id. at 19, 22.
207. Id. at 22.
208. See id. at 46.
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order to arrive at a true interpretation of the law, even static law, there must be a
recognition and embrace of civil disobedience as an act of interpretation.2 °9
Dworkin, Cover, and others have attempted to create a sustainable model of the
rule of law that recognizes that the law is subject to an interpretive process that
includes acts of resistance and rebellion.21° If one accepts this reconceptualiza-
tion of the rule of law, nullification becomes a necessary means of insuring the
vital bridge between the community and the static law. The next question, then,
is who gets to participate in the process?
B. JURY NULLIFICATION AS POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
The post-Apprendi jury embraces this modern notion of the rule of law by
allowing citizens to judge the factual basis for a defendant's culpability and
sanction. This jury is a second coming of the Founders' vision of the citizen as
the ideal source of legal meaning. From this point, the constitutional right to a
jury trial takes on a dual meaning. In one sense, it belongs to a defendant. It is
an opportunity to force the State to prove the defendant's guilt to his or her
peers. It prevents oppressive or arbitrary prosecutions and convictions by
forcing trials into the open, or at least to an audience of jurors.
Equally important, however, the jury takes on significance for the larger
society. It serves the role of lending meaning to the law and so expanding the
definition of the law beyond the mere written text. It is the opportunity for the
citizens of the community affected by the defendant's act to weigh in on the
significance of that act and so to embed the jurors' political views in the law,
even if only one verdict at a time.
Under this tradition, a jury is a moment when the citizen confronts the text of
the law and figuratively lays it side by side with a defendant's narrative. It is a
moment when people no more extraordinary than their ability to survive voir
dire can examine what they seek from the law and what they expect from the
law in return. It is a moment when a community engages in the most fundamen-
tal of negotiations-to judge not only what acts a defendant engaged in but also
the significance of those acts to the larger body politic.
Normally, this moment may pass quietly with jurors retiring to deliberate on
the simultaneously mundane and weighty questions of which witness's story to
believe or whether the government in fact met its burden of proof. In such
instances, the jury may find itself spared of any weighty conflict between the
function of their role as the "bulwark of ... libert[y] 211 and their formalistic
role of fact-finder as prescribed in Sparf.
But every now and then, the moment is more. A defendant asks a jury not
209. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 206-22 (1977); Cover, supra note 3, at 49
('"he creation of legal meaning cannot take place in silence. But neither can it take place without the
committed action that distinguishes law from literature.").
210. See Cover, supra note 3, at 50.




only to consider the acts that the State seeks to criminalize but also to question
more fundamentally whether those acts should in fact be sanctionable in the
case of this particular defendant or (in some cases) at all. Akin to popular
constitutionalism on a microcosmic scale-for single defendants and single
verdicts-nullification creates a fourth branch of government-the citizen jury.
This branch can respond more agilely and definitively in the courtroom than
other branches when a moment of crisis or resistance presents.212 Read through
this theoretical framework, a coherent line connects the most cited instances of
nullification. The factor that the Revolution-era printer, the abolitionist, the
white supremacist, the prohibitionist, the war protestors, Marion Barry, O.J.
Simpson, or any of the others has in common is that each sought to couch their
cases in terms of the political, social, and moral crises that faced the country.
The meaning of the law in these times of crisis is forged through the interplay of
the sterile text of law handed down by judges and legislators and the people the
law would govern. Without this opportunity to assign citizen meaning to the law
through a process of nullification, the law is unable to negotiate the complexi-
ties of competing perspectives and community values.213
This was and is the beauty of the Founders' vision of the jury. To protect the
democracy, they created (to paraphrase Justices Brandeis and Stevens) a safety
valve in each citizen who would one day sit in judgment as a juror.214 In the
face of overwhelming pressure that might otherwise split the country, they
vested the meaning of the law in the hands of the ordinary people the law
governed.215 More tangible than the right to vote, the right to a jury promised
that at any given moment the common citizen could confront the drama of the
day-be it slavery or war or racism or government oppression-and force the
law to answer for it. This ensured that the law, and the process of the law, would
forever expand in times of crisis and strive to truly reflect the will of the
governed.216
Admittedly, it is an imperfect process, as are all democratic processes.
Categorical exclusions from jury eligibility; the voir dire process; prosecutorial,
legislative, and judicial choices; and the vagaries of trial itself all limit the jury's
ability to effectively encompass the will of the population and to address
212. Cf. LARRY D. KRAmER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL
REViEw 9-34 (2004) (arguing that customary constitutionalism is realized when it reflects the world as
experienced by citizens).
213. See Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitution from a Social Movement
Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 316-18 (2001).
214. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477; Homing v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135, 140 (1920)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
215. See STMSON, supra note 55, at 142-43.
216. See id.; see also Andrew J. Parmenter, Nullifying the Jury: "The Judicial Oligarchy" Declares
War on Jury Nullification, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 379, 380 (2007) (describing juries as "courts of
conscience" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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underlying conflicts within the community.2" 7 It could even be argued that a
restricted jury pool was a necessary prerequisite to the Founders' faith in the
28jury. 18 At the time of the Constitution's drafting, a homogenous group of
citizens composed juries. This was no accident. Restrictions on eligibility for
jury duty ensured that only a certain type of person would sit in judgment as a
juror.219 In practical terms, this would have meant that the jury's reflection of
community values and conscience would have sprung from a relatively exclu-
sive and known population.220 So to the extent the Founders viewed jurors as
serving as a bridge between the law and the community upon which the law
would be applied, this bridge would not have encompassed the perspectives of
all people the law affected. In fact, those most at risk of oppression under the
law (women, the poor, and people of color) would have been ineligible for jury
duty. Just as they would have had no voice in the creation and enforcement of
the written law, they would have had no place in the jury box to redefine that
law to include their experience. The jury could serve as a sort of paternalistic
check on the power of the state over these individuals' lives, but it would hardly
have offered them an open forum for participation or change. Whatever populist
ideal may have informed the Founders' faith in jurors to engage in nullification
as a means of legitimating and defining the law through direct community
review, the Founders' generation also went to great lengths to limit the eligible
population and so the perspectives and empathies of the jurors who would judge
the law and the defendants.
This vision of the homogenous jury would have also supported the idea that
there was a truly common law that the everyman knew and could apply with no
skills but his conscience.221 Citizens who served as jurors were likely known
quantities (particularly given that the Constitution required local juries for most
charges). This allowed the Founders to view the jury's "conscience" as more
monolithic than could be found in the more diverse communities of jurors that
characterized the nation after its first century of existence. The Founders may
have perceived a more readily identifiable sense of morality that a local citizen
could articulate and apply. There would have been a surer sense among a small
ruling class of who they were and who "the other" was. That sense eroded as
the population and juror eligibility expanded, and the courts responded in kind,
expressing increasing reservations about the wisdom of juror review of the
217. See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 18, at 878-82 (discussing the evolution of juror eligibility in
the United States and noting that "the liberalization of voting requirements was not always accompa-
nied by a similar liberalization of requirements for jury service").
218. See id. at 877-78.
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. Cf id. at 914-16 (noting that the small population eligible to serve as jurors, coupled with the
relative scarcity of written law, would have allowed the Founders to view the common law as truly





This, then, raises the question of whether the Founders' vision of a jury of
citizens defining and interpreting the law was truly meant to serve as a bridge
between the government and the citizenry, or if these jurors were just a
mechanism to reinforce the elected government's imposed law. Under the latter
view, the jury lent an appearance of community participation in the creation of
the law but in reality ensured that the law would continue to be defined by a
ruling class-here, white, male, property-owning jurors as opposed to white,
male, property-owning legislators. The Founders' writings, however, suggest
that their intention was in fact that jurors would act as the critical bridge
between the law and community. Restrictions on the eligible community were
more a product of the Founders' time and concepts of humanity and power than
an effort to render the jury the rubber stamp of other designated lawmakers. The
Court in defining the modem jury has abandoned the antiquated concepts of
juror eligibility, while still supporting the Founders' vision of the jury as the
check on government.223
But despite continued expansions of jury eligibility and definitions of citizen-
ship, systematic exclusion of members of the community from juries re-
mains.224 To the extent that nullification is laudable because it offers an
opportunity for the community to define the meaning of law, these benefits are
mitigated if the jury only reflects those already making their voices heard
through formalized electoral processes.
As troubling as this reality is, such failings do not undermine the legitimacy
of nullification, nor do they obliterate the benefit of the jury's interpretive
process. Despite these imperfections, nullification offers a rare opportunity for
the citizenry to instill meaning in the law through their direct involvement and
application of their conscience. The challenge as the Court seeks to revitalize
the Founders' vision of the jury is to address the processes, formalized and
otherwise, that produce such exclusions.
222. See Parmenter, supra note 216, at 386-87 (stating that as liberalization of jury eligibility
created more diverse jury pools, support for jury assessment of law waned, particularly with the
increase of immigrant jurors); see also LYSANDER SPOONER, AN ESSAY ON THE TRIAL BY JURY 8 (Boston,
John P. Jewett & Co. 1852), available at http://lysanderspooner.org/node/35 (indicating that, in re-
sponse to apparent jury nullification surrounding the Fugitive Slave Law, voir dire began to be used to
remove nullifying jurors).
223. Cf. SPOONER, supra note 222, at 9 (suggesting that jury interpretation of laws is supported by
theories of justice). Contemporary judges have recognized that interpreting the Sixth Amendment right
to jury trial requires them to translate practices across four centuries and to reconcile constitutional
goals with modem realities. See United States v. Khan, 325 F Supp. 2d 218, 226 (E.D.N.Y. 2004)
("[A]ny attempt to fully understand and apply eighteenth-century rules for juries in twenty-first century
federal sentencing is bound to be somewhat chimerical.... [Courts] tend to adopt... unsophisticated
political assumptions of nineteenth as well as twenty-first century historians .... ").
224. See EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIvE, ILLEGAL RACIAL DISCRIMINAnTON IN JURY SELECTION: A CONTINUmG
LEGACY 4-6 (2010), available at http://eji.org/eji/filesIEJI%2ORace%20and%2OJury%2OReport.pdf (con-
cluding that nearly 135 years after Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1875 to eliminate racial
discrimination in jury selection, people of color and women continue to be excluded from juries
because of their race and gender, especially in serious criminal and death-penalty cases).
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The most obvious solution is to expand the jury pool, thereby increasing
diversity at the venire and empanelled levels. To some, this expansion of the
jury pool may appear to exacerbate the risks of nullification. They might argue
that the new jurors who would be brought into the system are more likely to be
the kind of unsophisticated jurors who are susceptible to rendering verdicts
based solely on emotions or misplaced empathies. This premise is empirically
questionable, of course. But even if one accepts it, it is hypocritical to suggest
that the best way to combat ignorance is to reduce the information provided to
jurors. Opponents of nullification would seek to bar jury instructions on the
historical right to judge the law, and indeed any discussion of interpretation of
the law by jurors, for the sake of avoiding ignorance.225 The argument also
overlooks the possibility that the empathies of the jurors may be based not on
ignorance but rather on a sincere desire to give alternative voice to the law.
226
In any event, any increased risk of nullification presented by an increase in
juror diversity is limited because, on a fundamental level, the process of juror
nullification requires jurors to develop some empathy for the defendant's narra-
tive that exceeds their empathy for the constructed law and the designated
community that produced that vision of the law. While a juror need not
convince all members of the jury to join him or her in their empathy-in
jurisdictions requiring unanimity in verdicts, a single juror can nullify the
proceeding by preventing the jury from reaching a verdict-he or she does have
to hold sufficient conviction in his or her belief to stand in the face of his or her
fellow jurors' opposition and redefine the law in the shape of his or her own
conscience. This will require a level of commitment to the values of the
defendant's narrative that exceeds other community values, including those
allegedly embodied in the written law.
This reality not only suggests that the risk of nullification is perhaps exagger-
ated but also confirms once again the value of nullification itself. When even a
single juror so identifies with a defendant's narrative over that of the formalized
government and the written law, he or she gives voice to a segment of the
community that has become disconnected from the written law. This disconnect
may be systematic or limited to a particular case or defendant, but its presence
deserves a forum if we are truly seeking to create a body of law that is
responsive to communal values.227 The courtroom and a juror's ballot may be
its only space. It may be too disjointed, isolated, or erratic to present in other
225. Judge Weinstein proposes that the surest way to avoid ignorance and erratic nullification is to
reinsert nullification into the formalized process and thus educate jurors of its appropriate uses. See
United States v. Polizzi, 549 F. Supp. 2d 308, 433 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), vacated, 564 F.3d 142 (2d Cir.
2009).
226. See Butler, supra note 16, at 678-80, 694 & n.88, 715-18 (urging nullification because the
prosecutorial and justice systems have disproportionately targeted African-American males, have failed
to provide reform or rehabilitation, and, as a result, have created a hero worship around the status of
felon within certain African-American communities, completely undermining the point of the criminal
prohibition).
227. This, admittedly, may itself be a questionable premise.
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more formalized spaces, such as legislative or executive mechanisms of reform.
But the value of the democracy is promoted when this alternative narrative is
allowed to present, even in a less formalized setting-such as in a jury delibera-
tion room.
Some might respond that nullification gives undue weight to a single juror's
perspective. Hung verdicts, however, may be retried if the State elects. Admit-
tedly, such retrials will create strains on the defendant's, the State's, and the
court's resources, but the relative rarity of nullification, even during periods of
judicial endorsement of the concept, suggests that such strains will be minor.2 28
Second, and perhaps more significantly, the fear that increased juror eligibility
will raise the possibility of nullification indicates that formalized processes of
change have done a poor job of responding to the divergent perspectives of the
community. This acknowledgement confirms that the Founders' sense that the
jury was the last great check for community values is as accurate today as when
the Founders first envisioned it. These jurors truly act as the circuit breakers
Justice Stevens described, checking dangerous surges of power that threaten to
collapse the very system.229 In this, the juror's role fits neatly into concepts of
corrective democracy described by popular constitutionalism. In moments of
crisis, they are nimble responders, instilling the law with a flexibility to answer
the challenges that might otherwise split it asunder or render it moot.
C. THE PROCESS OF NULLIFICATION
At the end of the day, the debate over jury nullification is fundamentally
about process. As discussed above, the substantive power of jury nullification
cannot be eradicated as long as constitutional protections such as the Double
Jeopardy Clause and the standard of proof remain.230 The ultimate question
raised by the Court's renewed faith in the jury is, what process should accom-
pany the possibility of nullification? While a full treatment of this question is
beyond the scope of this Article, it nonetheless warrants some initial thoughts.
The most obvious procedural modification would be the creation of a jury
instruction informing the jury of their right to consider not only the facts of the
case but also to interpret the law. While such an instruction is a critical first step
in revitalizing the jury's ability to nullify, it is hardly complete.23'
228. See supra note 134.
229. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000) (noting that trial by jury helps to "guard
against a spirit of oppression and tyranny on the part of rulers [and is] the -great bulwark of [our] civil
and political liberties" (second alteration in original) (quoting STORY, supra note 10) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
230. See supra notes 134-41 and accompanying text.
231. There have always been legitimate questions about the effectiveness of jury instructions as a
general matter, such as whether they confuse jurors more than illuminating the law. See Harvey S.
Pelman, Pattern Jury Instructions: The Application of Social Science Research, 65 NEB. L. REv. 520,
528-31 (1986) (criticizing some pattern jury instructions as being unclear to jurors); Laurence J.
Severance, Edith Greene & Elizabeth F Loftus, Toward Criminal Jury Instructions That Jurors Can
Understand, 75 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 198, 201-02 (1984) (noting that while jury instructions may
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In addition, courts must create a sanctioned space for defendants to argue
nullification and produce evidence to support this theory of defense. There are a
number of possibilities. One is for nullification to be treated as a defense similar
to broad justification, necessity, or duress defenses.232 Defendants would be
allowed to argue that their alleged actions are not or should not be criminal and
to introduce evidence, subject to judicial ruling based on evidentiary rules, to
support this argument.
As a practical matter, however, the defense of nullification, while not dissimi-
lar to defenses such as justification, necessity, or duress, may present some
unique evidentiary problems. What sort of evidence should a defendant seeking
nullification be allowed to present to support his or her defense? Take, for
example, a War-on-Terror detainee who seeks to argue that his various alleged
actions were justified, and therefore not criminal, because they were the only
available response to the "oppressive" policies of the United States toward
Islam. The effectiveness of this defense, like any defense, hinges on the
defendant's ability not only to persuade the jurors of the logic of his or her
arguments but also to gain the jurors' empathy for the defendant's narrative.
Setting aside for a moment the real possibility that gaining such empathy is
unrealistic given the improbability that members of the jury have shared the
defendant's life experience, such an argument raises evidentiary and procedural
dilemmas. In order to develop properly the defense, the defendant will inevita-
bly seek to present evidence and argument that is increasingly remote from the
act for which the defendant stands accused. He might, for example, seek to
present evidence of his life in a remote country where he experienced firsthand
the "tyranny" of U.S. foreign policy, or evidence that he was indoctrinated to
fear or hate the United States. This evidence certainly informs the defendant's
perspective and may be critical to understanding why the defendant committed
the act for which he stands accused. Beyond this, it provides critical context as
to why the defendant believes, and seeks to argue, that his or her act was not
criminal but a justified act the law should take exception to.
survive appellate review, they do little to help jurors understand the law and frequently create more
confusion); see also supra note 98 and accompanying text (discussing the potential for nullification
through general verdict forms). In the recent corruption trial of former Illinois Governor Rod Blagojev-
ich, jurors indicated that they were overwhelmed by the jury instructions. See Monica Davey & Susan
Saulny, Jurors Fault Complexity of the Blagojevich Trial, N.Y. TIMEs (Aug. 18, 2010), http:l
www.nytimes.com/2010/08/19/us/19jury.html. One juror likened the experience of receiving the highly
complicated instructions to being told, "Here's a manual, go fly the space shuttle." Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
232. Illinois, for example, allows a broad affirmative defense of justification or necessity, which
enables a defendant to present evidence that he believed his actions were justified by the circumstances.
See, e.g., 1 ILL. SUPREME Couir COMM. ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES, ILLINOIS
PAtrERN JuRy INsTRUCTIoNs-CRIMINAL § 7.05 (4th ed. 2011) (allowing a charge of first-degree murder to
be reduced to second-degree murder if "the defendant believes that circumstances exist which would
justify the deadly force"); id. § 24-25.22 (allowing the defense that "the defendant ... reasonably
believed that [his] conduct was necessary to avoid a public or private injury greater than the injury
which might reasonably result from his own conduct").
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Should the trial judge therefore allow such evidence? If so, where should she
draw the line around evidence that is relevant to the defense and appropriately
admitted and evidence that is too extraneous to warrant jury consideration?
Admittedly, nullification defenses will likely seek to draw increasingly wider
circles of relevant evidence removed from the "criminalized" event. But the
question of what evidence is truly relevant to the jury's inquiry is one judges
already manage. They routinely must make decisions about what evidence is
too far removed from the question before the jury and what evidence, though
apparently extraneous, nonetheless is necessary to "fully" inform the jury's
decision. An embrace of a defense of nullification inevitably will require more
extensive consideration of the parameters of "relevant" evidence as the new
defense is defined. Such considerations, however, do not counsel against allow-
ing the defense of nullification any more than they would counsel against the
admission of mitigation, justification, or any other "defense"-oriented evidence
whose propriety is well established.
Moreover, the fact that the defense may fail in some cases absent a carte
blanche evidentiary approach does not suggest that the defense is inappropriate
or disruptive to the proceedings. In fact, it looks no different from the dilemma
of allowing any defense-the need to balance constantly the State's desire to
distill a criminal charge to a singular event or moment when a defendant
allegedly engaged in a prohibited act, and the defendant's desire to expand the
jury's consideration to events and circumstances beyond the alleged criminal
act. That this balance creates evidentiary challenges is the reality of a process
that permits defenses and is, by its nature, fraught with competing narratives.
Nullification as a defense adds layers to that narrative, but the opportunity for
the jury, and so the community, to contemplate stories of resistance traditionally
excluded from the formalized process enriches, rather than diminishes, the
democratic process.
CONCLUSION
Nullification is a conspiracy among the most unlikely of allies: the defendant,
who would challenge the legitimacy of the law, and the community, which lends
legitimacy to the law by agreeing to serve as both its source and the subject of
its application. In this alliance, the jury and the defendant assume their roles as
political actors, lending meaning and viability to the law.
For a defendant, nullification is transformative. It is a mechanism that
changes the defendant's act from a potentially criminal one to one of civil
disobedience. In this transformation, the underlying act may remain criminal-
and ultimately the jury may vote to convict the defendant-but he defendant's
call to nullify lends the act another meaning, and so other powers. It ceases to
be a single act and joins a larger narrative of change and dissent. The act takes
on a symbolic meaning previously absent. It becomes a call to arms, to
revolution, to redefine the law (or some aspect of it) in favor of some larger
truth or even just the opportunity to express belief in that truth.
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The jury is the ideal ally in the defendant's struggle to redefine the law. Jurors
are in a unique position to encompass the community's values within the rule of
law. To the extent that the law flows from communal compromise of morals and
practicality forged in the hallowed chambers of power-the legislative, execu-
tive, and judicial branches-jurors occupy a fourth branch that exists in the
borderland between what the community hopes the law can achieve and the
reality of its application on and by everyday citizens. Through nullification, the
jurors claim for themselves the right to interpret and define the law in a manner
that weighs the narratives of their fellow citizens, including narratives of dissent
and resistance, against the written body of the law.
Nullification forces the law into motion and expansion. The law cannot
remain idle and static in the face of ordinary men and women granted a
momentary and limited power to judge, interpret, and define the law by their
very commonality. It is a call for accounting rooted in a long tradition of
bottom-up lawmaking. This tradition is premised on the notion that any man
(and, at least in recent decades, any woman) can take his or her vision of the
law and make it whole by applying it as a juror. Whether one believes that
nullification represents a rejection of the law or merely a redefinition of the law
beyond writing, there is no doubt that it represents a moment of transformation.
As the Apprendi case line strives to define the role of the modem jury, it can
take shelter in the Founders' vision of the jury as a true political force that lends
meaning to the law through its ability to hear and embrace the narrative of every
defendant who stands to be judged. By necessity, Apprendi opens a space for
nullification. Apprendi re-empowers jurors to define the law through their
application of it to the men and women who live within it so they do not suffer
beneath it. It is simultaneously the resurrection of originalism and the rebirth of
the Constitution in populist legalism. It is the opening of a "pathway[] of
communication" whereby the ordinary becomes extraordinary as it seeks to
redefine what law is and who determines its borders.2 33 Admittedly, the scope of
this power of nullification is limited to the courtroom, and it affects one verdict
and one defendant at a time. But this forum is nonetheless ignificant. It is the
forum where citizens attempt to locate and give meaning to the law. The halls of
Congress may be the rarified chambers where the written law is made, but in the
simple courtroom the community attempts to address the tension between what
that written law can or should be and the reality of the law as applied to the men
and women who stand accused. The ability to make that inquiry-to hear the
dissent and weigh it within the context of the community's ethic and law-is at
the core of the constitutional democracy envisioned by the Founders. It is a
vindication of the rule of law, not its demise.
233. See Siegel, supra note 213, at 319; see also id. at 303 ("[D]ialogue between citizenry and
judiciary... is far more commonplace in our constitutional order than constitutional theory commonly
acknowledges."); id. at 317-18 ("Through pathways of meaning, law can structure social life ..... [and]
all manner of social actors can shape law ... ").
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As the nation faces increasing challenges to its written laws and policies both
domestically and internationally, the need for the adoption of a process that
recognizes the historical role and value of the jury as the interpreter of the law
becomes more acute. The need to undo the mechanized application of the
written law and to consider the competing narratives of defendants who would
challenge that writing becomes increasingly imperative. This is not because
such consideration will likely change the outcome for Guantanamo detainees or
other radicals who would call on the jury to undo the whole system of
government (something the jurors lack the power to do), but because such
consideration opens a forum for the debate and examination of our communal
values and the written law's ability to reflect them. In this open debate, the
democracy moves forward, and the law retains its ability to ebb and flow with
the tides of the nation.

